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ARTICLES
ALASKA EQUAL PROTECTION:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OR
COMMON LAW?   
PAUL E. MCGREAL
This Article compares the equal protection analysis of the United
States Supreme Court with the equal protection analysis of the
Alaska Supreme Court.  It first looks at the federal equal protec-
tion doctrine and the various levels of scrutiny employed by the
Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of government
action.  The conclusion of the federal analysis is that, no matter
which level of scrutiny the Court uses, its ultimate goal is always a
means-end inquiry designed to test the government’s asserted pur-
pose in enacting the law.  Next, the Article looks at Alaska’s
“sliding scale” approach to equal protection and contends that this
approach results in an arbitrary amount of deference being given
to the legislature in a common law fashion.  The Article concludes
by recommending future study of other state courts to determine if
state constitutional law actually offers a worthwhile complement
to federal constitutional law.
PROLOGUE
This Article is written in honor of Justice Jay A. Rabinowitz,
who only recently has ended the longest tenure on any state bench
in Alaska.  During my year clerking for the Alaska Supreme
Court, I am happy to say that Justice Rabinowitz not only served
as a valued mentor, but became a trusted friend.  Since leaving
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Alaska, our friendship has grown, and I have often turned to him
for advice as I navigate a life in the law.  For these reasons, I am
honored to participate in an issue of the Alaska Law Review that
honors this great person and lawyer.
In many ways, the work that follows is a product of the time I
spent with Justice Rabinowitz.  In our discussions over cases,
briefs, and arguments, he helped me see the subtle under-currents
that run through the law.  What was on the surface was not always
what ultimately mattered.  This Article builds on that insight by
beginning a critical examination of state constitutional law, using
Alaska equal protection doctrine as the springboard.
I. INTRODUCTION
Federalism is making a comeback.1  Both case law and com-
mentary pay increased attention to the federal-state relationship in
our American system of government.2  Much of the attention has
1. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, A Constitutional Revolution, WALL ST. J.,
July 10, 1997, at A14.
2. In a string of decisions, the Supreme Court has construed federal power
narrowly, thereby leaving states free of certain federal regulation.  See, e.g., City
of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act because Congress’s power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment does not include the power to define the content of
rights protected by that Amendment); Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365,
2384 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the provision of the Brady Act that re-
quired state law enforcement officials to perform background checks on gun pur-
chasers); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding
that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, enacted under the Indian Commerce
Clause of Article I, could not abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding unconstitutional the
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, which criminalized possession of a gun
within one thousand feet of a school zone); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511
U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code’s requirement of a
“reasonably equivalent value” in foreclosure sales is satisfied as long as the sale
complies with state law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)
(holding Congress cannot compel states to enact a federal scheme for regulating
disposal of hazardous waste); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-70 (1991)
(holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not apply to state
judges).  Federalism also has gained increasing attention in the nation’s law re-
views.  See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a
Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (1994); Deborah Jones Merritt,
The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism,
79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
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focused on the constitutional limits of federal power, with the im-
plicit assumption that such limits necessarily protect the states.3
The reasons we protect federalism are well rehearsed.  First,
by splitting power between levels of government, federalism di-
lutes power and protects individuals from government oppression.4
In this regard, federalism shares goals with the principle of separa-
tion of powers, which divides power among branches of govern-
ment, to prevent concentration of power.5  Second, federalism pre-
serves state and local governments as laboratories for policy
experimentation.6  Each state is free, within the confines of the
3. Professor H. Jefferson Powell of Duke University School of Law has ex-
plained that the Anti-Federalists who opposed the Constitution were troubled by
the prospect of diminished state power:
The Anti-Federalist concern was that the Constitution would ultimately
reduce the states to the status of municipal corporations not by pre-
empting their processes but by pre-empting their business. . . .  [T]he ef-
fective extension of congressional authority to all areas of major legisla-
tive interest . . . is precisely the consequence of adopting the Constitu-
tion that the Anti-Federalists predicted . . . — the reduction of the states
to autonomous governmental processes concerned with only those af-
fairs left to them by Congress.
H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV.
633, 658 (1993) (footnote omitted).
4. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 338-39 (James Madison) (Robert B. Luce
ed., 1976).  Madison writes:
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submit-
ted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are
guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and sepa-
rate departments.  In the compound republic of America, the power sur-
rendered by the people is first divided between two distinct govern-
ments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct
and separate departments.  Hence a double security arises to the rights
of the people.  The different governments will control each other, at the
same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Id; see also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 36 (1995); Michael
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1504 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’
DESIGN (1987)).
5. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 4.
6. This justification is associated closely with Justice Louis Brandeis.  See
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); see also Arizona
v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]his court should se-
lect a jurisdictional presumption that encourages states to explore different means
to secure respect for individual rights in modern times.”); DANIEL ELAZAR,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (3d ed. 1984); Maeva Mar-
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federal constitution, to experiment with novel solutions to shared
problems.7  Thus, experimentation should hasten progress as the
several states can learn from one another’s experiences.8
This Article joins the debate over the second justification for
federalism.  The implicit assumption of that justification is that
states will, if left to do so, experiment.9  This Article begins an ex-
amination of that assumption in the area of state constitutional
law, using Alaska equal protection doctrine as the initial focus.
The last decade has seen an increased interest among commenta-
tors in the question of whether state constitutional law adds any-
thing new to the discipline of constitutional law, or whether the
whole enterprise merely reduces to individual state courts ex-
pressing their disagreement with particular decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.10  If interpretation of state constitutions is
                                                                                                                                
cus, Louis D. Brandeis and the Laboratories of Democracy, in FEDERALISM AND
THE JUDICIAL MIND: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
75 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1992).  Of course, this view has its critics.  See Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innova-
tion?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 614-16 (1980); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 2, at 923-
35.
7. See MARCUS, supra note 6, at 75.
8. Other justifications for federalism have been offered.  See generally
SHAPIRO, supra note 4 (describing and critiquing various arguments for and
against federalism).
9. See supra note 6.
10. Justice William Brennan is widely viewed as sparking the renewed interest
in state constitutional law.  For Brennan’s two influential articles, see William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1977); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 535 (1986).  For commentaries on Brennan’s position, see Earl M. Maltz,
False Prophet — Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 429, 429 (1988); Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as
Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983)
(referring to Brennan’s 1977 Harvard Law Review article on state constitutional
law as the “Magna Carta” of the subject).  For a sampling of the current debate,
see James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 761 (1992); Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the
Common Law Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583 (1986) (reviewing DEVELOPMENTS
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (B. McGraw ed. 1985)); David Schuman, Corre-
spondence, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 274
(1992); Hugh D. Spitzer, Which Constitution?  Eleven Years of Gunwall in Wash-
ington, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1187 (1998);  Donald C. Wintersheimer, Relation-
ship Between Federal and State Constitutional Law, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 257 (1998);
State Constitutional Law Commentary: An Interdisciplinary Examination of State
Courts, State Constitutional Law, and State Constitutional Adjudication, 60 ALB.
L. REV. 1509 (1997); State Constitutional Law Commentary: An Interdisciplinary
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limited merely to rehashing the rationales of Supreme Court
opinions, then state constitutional law adds little to the debate.11
Regardless of one’s view, state constitutional law is a growing body
of law that commentators and practitioners neglect at their own
peril.12
                                                                                                                                
Examination of State Courts, State Constitutional Law, and State Constitutional
Adjudication, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1539 (1996).  For those interested in the breadth of
the discussion, substantial bibliographies on the subject have been published.  See,
e.g., DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra; TIM J. WATTS,
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENT: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1991); Earl M.
Maltz et al., Selected Bibliography on State Constitutional Law, 1980. . .1989, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 1093 (1989).  Also, Greenwood Press is currently publishing single
volume  “reference guides” for the constitution of each state.  The volume for the
Alaska constitution is GERALD A. MCBEATH, THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE (1997).
11. See Gardner, supra note 10, at 836-37 (arguing that state constitutions
should and do play a marginal role in constitutional dialogue).  However, Gard-
ner’s view is not shared by all.  See, e.g., Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance on State
Constitutions — The Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1095 (1985); Neil
McCabe, The State and Federal Religion Clauses: Differences of Degree and Kind,
5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 49, 50-51 (1992) (“State constitutional law protection can
also be different in form and in kind—not simply degree—from that provided un-
der the Federal Constitution.”); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amen-
domania and State Bills of Rights, 54 MISS. L.J. 223, 225-35 (1984); Robert F. Wil-
liams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme
Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 401-04 (1984).
12. See Cynthia Cumfer, Original Intent v. Modern Judicial Philosophy: Ore-
gon’s Home Rule Case Frames the Dilemma for State Constitutionalism, 76 OR. L.
REV. 909 (1997); Jennifer DiGiovanni, Justice Charles M. Leibson and the Revival
of State Constitutional Law: A Microcosm of a Movement, 86 KY. L.J. 1009 (1997-
1998); James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the
Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1219 (1998); Joseph R. Grodin, Rediscovering the State Constitu-
tional Right to Happiness and Safety, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1997); Neil
Colman McCabe, Four Faces of State Constitutional Separation of Powers: Chal-
lenges to Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition Provisions, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 177,
178-85 (1989); Neil Colman McCabe, Legislative Facts as Evidence in State Con-
stitutional Search Analysis, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1229 (1992); Neil Colman McCabe,
State Constitutions and the “Open Fields” Doctrine: A Historical-Definitional
Analysis of the Scope of Protection Against Warrantless Searches of “Possessions,”
13 VT. L. REV. 179, 190-93 (1988); Neil Colman McCabe, The Right to a Lawyer
at a Lineup: Support From State Courts and Experimental Psychology, 22 IND. L.
REV. 905, 907 (1989); James T. McHugh, A Liberal Theocracy: Philosophy, The-
ology, and Utah Constitutional Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1515, 1526-69 (1997); Ellen
A. Peters, Capacity and Respect: A Perspective on the Historic Role of the State
Courts in the Federal System, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065 (1998); Jack Stark, Enig-
matic Grants of Law-Making Rights and Responsibilities in the Wisconsin Consti-
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Alaska equal protection doctrine offers a unique opportunity
to study the independent development of state constitutional law.
For the last twenty years, the Alaska Supreme Court has applied a
different equal protection test from that applied under federal
equal protection doctrine.13  This Article examines Alaska case law
to see if Alaska’s experiment really offers anything new.  Ulti-
mately, we will see that the answer is both “yes” and “no.”  Alaska
equal protection doctrine is different from federal equal protection
doctrine, but is not significantly different from state court common
law reasoning.  This Article develops this thesis in three parts.
Part II of this Article surveys the federal constitutional doc-
trine of equal protection.  The doctrine incorporates the method of
means-end analysis, asking first whether the government is pursu-
ing a permissible end, and then asking whether the law is an ade-
quate means toward achieving the government’s end.14  The Su-
preme Court uses three levels of means-end scrutiny.  The strictest
level of scrutiny — known, appropriately enough, as “strict scru-
tiny” — applies to laws that discriminate based on race, alienage,
and national origin.15  Such laws are rarely upheld.16  The next
strictest level of scrutiny — known as “intermediate scrutiny” —
applies to laws that discriminate based on gender.17  Such laws gen-
                                                                                                                                
tution, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 961 (1998); G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Porter, Gen-
der Equality and Judicial Federalism: The Role of State Appellate Courts, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 919, 950-52 (1982); Celebrating Wisconsin’s Constitution
150 Years Later, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 661; State Constitutional Law Symposium, 28
N.M. L. REV. 191 (1998).
13. See Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 361-63 (Alaska 1976) (beginning
Alaska’s departure from the federal equal protection analysis); see also Mata-
nuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 396-97 (Alaska 1997)
(explaining that Alaska courts use a “sliding-scale” approach to determine the
level of scrutiny for equal protection cases); Christine M. Motta, Comment, The
Supreme Court of Alaska: Unique and Independent Like the People of the Last
Frontier, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1727, 1734 (1997); Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the
“Last Frontier,” Professor Gardner: Alaska’s Independent Approach to State Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 11-17 (1995); Michael B. Wise,
Northern Lights — Equal Protection Analysis in Alaska, 3 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 21-
35 (1986).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 9.3.2, at 550-52 (1997); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1451-54 (2d ed. 1988).
16. See TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-6, at 1451; Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
17. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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erally are struck down if the Court believes that they are based on
a gender stereotype.18  The most lenient level of scrutiny — known
as “rational basis review” — applies to all other laws.19  The Court
generally upholds such laws unless it determines that the govern-
ment acted based on a desire to harm a specific group.20
Part II also offers an original synthesis of the Supreme Court’s
equal protection cases.  While some have criticized the Court’s
three levels of scrutiny as a rigid three-tiered hierarchy,21 the cases
really reduce to a single inquiry: Does the government have some
neutral, independent reason for distinguishing between groups of
people, or is the law motivated by a bare dislike of the burdened
group?22  The different equal protection tests are really the means
adopted by the Court to answer this question.  Without such a
guiding rationale, the means-end scrutiny of equal protection
would be largely an unguided inquiry.  As discussed below,
whether a particular law is an adequate means to achieve the gov-
ernment’s end is a difficult policy judgment that courts are ill-
suited to perform.23  In questions of equal protection, however, the
Supreme Court does not use a pure means-end analysis.  Rather,
means-end scrutiny is used to determine whether the government
has acted out of prejudice or on a neutral basis.
An example should illustrate how means-end analysis can
help evaluate an actor’s purpose.  Suppose a neighbor with whom
you are on questionable terms offers to wash your car.  Given the
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993).
20. See infra Part II.D.
21. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109-10 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
22. This synthesis shares the view of Justice John Paul Stevens that the
Court’s three levels of scrutiny mask the true structure of the Court’s analysis:
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered
analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has em-
ployed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a rea-
sonably consistent fashion.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).  Professor Jed
Rubenfeld recently has defended a similar view of the Supreme Court’s equal
protection cases.  See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 432-
44 (1997).  This Article offers my articulation of the Court’s “single standard” and
how the three tiers of scrutiny logically implement that standard.
23. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 235-
55 (1976); Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or What’s Really Wrong with
Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1979).
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history of your relationship, you are suspicious that her offer might
be less than genuine, but you nonetheless agree.  Since you are
suspicious of your neighbor’s motives, however, you watch as she
begins washing your car.  You notice that she is using water from
mud puddles on the ground.  At this point, you probably think (as
you run out the door to stop her), “Hmm.  If she really wanted to
wash my car, she probably wouldn’t use muddy water.  That
scoundrel probably wants to damage my car.”  This is an instance
where analyzing the means of accomplishing an objective has re-
vealed a person’s true end.  Your neighbor asserted that her end
was to wash your car.  Yet, the means she chose (muddy water)
were so ill-adapted to the task that you concluded that she must
have had another purpose.  This conclusion was bolstered by your
suspicion of her motives given your prior history of ill will.  The
means-end analysis “smoked out” your neighbor’s true purpose.
Equal protection means-end analysis performs a similar
“smok[ing] out” function.24  The government will enact a classifica-
tion and will assert a purpose behind that classification.  If the clas-
sification is a poor fit to the government’s purpose, we might sus-
pect that the government acted on another, unspoken purpose.
This suspicion will be quite high with classifications that histori-
cally have resulted from prejudice, such as race and gender dis-
crimination.25  Whatever the classification, though, the Court uses
means-end scrutiny to test the government’s asserted purpose and
determine whether a law really is enacted out of bias or prejudice.
Part II develops this point in discussing the three tiers of the fed-
eral equal protection test.
Part III traces the development of Alaska’s equal protection
analysis.  Like federal equal protection, Alaska courts use means-
end scrutiny to address equal protection violations.  Unlike federal
equal protection, however, Alaska has rejected the three tiers of
scrutiny in favor of a “sliding scale” comprised of multiple levels of
scrutiny that are tailored to the specific law at issue.
The most important difference between federal and Alaska
equal protection analysis is that the Alaska test does not use
means-end scrutiny to “smoke out” prejudice.  Rather, the Alaska
Supreme Court engages in pure means-end scrutiny, making policy
judgments about whether the challenged law adequately meets the
government’s purpose.26  Whereas the Supreme Court has con-
strained the means-end analysis of equal protection by limiting it
24. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part III.B., III.C.
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to the invalidation of biased legislation, Alaska equal protection
analysis leaves the inquiry unbounded.  For this reason, Part III
concludes that the Alaska Supreme Court’s equal protection deci-
sions often resemble common law decisions, with the court at times
giving little (if any) deference to the legislature’s judgment about
the need or desirability of a given law.  In equal protection cases,
the Alaska Supreme Court appears to be doing common law, not
constitutional law.
Based on the analysis in Parts II and III, Part IV proposes di-
rections for future study of state constitutional law.  Principally,
Part IV proposes that scholarship examine state constitutional law
at work in the state courts.  For, if nothing more than common
lawmaking is occurring under the guise of state constitutional law,
state constitutional law may have little insight to offer us.
II. FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
A review and synthesis of the United States Supreme Court’s
equal protection analysis is a necessary preface to what follows.
The doctrine sketched in this Part II will be used as a point of
comparison in Part III of the Article.
A. An Overview of Equal Protection Methodology
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion27 does not prohibit all legislation that distinguishes between
things or people.  Indeed, such a prohibition would be senseless
because all laws draw distinctions and thus discriminate in some
way.28  Instead, the Court asks whether the discrimination is justi-
fied given both the government’s purpose in enacting the law and
the means chosen to achieve that purpose.29  The Court often has
treated this inquiry as a two step process: (1) has the state chosen a
permissible end, and, if so, (2) are the means chosen sufficiently
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
28. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment’s promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws must co-exist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for
one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or per-
sons.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 9.1.2, at 527 (“Many government laws
draw a distinction among people and thus are potentially susceptible to an equal
protection challenge.”).
29. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 9.1.2, at 527 (“All equal protection
cases pose the same basic question: Is the government’s classification justified by
a sufficient purpose?”).
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related to achievement of the state’s end?30  In this analysis, the
“means” will be the classification created by the government’s ac-
tion.
An example should illustrate how equal protection methodol-
ogy works.  Consider the law at issue in New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer.31  In that case, the New York City Transit
Authority decided that it would not hire methadone users.32  The
Transit Authority imposed this hiring exclusion to protect the
public from unsafe subway workers.33  The government’s end and
means are easily identifiable: the end is passenger safety, and the
means is not hiring methadone users.  In analyzing the Transit
Authority’s hiring policy under the federal equal protection test, a
court would ask two questions: (1) is public safety a permissible
government purpose, and, if so, (2) do methadone users threaten
the government’s purpose (i.e., are methadone users unsafe transit
workers)?  The first question is normative, asking what ends we
think government should be allowed to pursue.34  The second ques-
tion is empirical, asking for the factual relationship between the
classification and the government’s purpose (how well the classifi-
cation “fits” the purpose).35
Federal equal protection analysis can vary in strength de-
pending on how we define each step.  The first question — is the
30. This second step has been referred to as assessing the “fit” between the
state’s end and the means chosen.  Thus, this Article occasionally will refer to the
second step as the “fit question.”  See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-32, at 1603-
04.
31. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
32. See id. at 570.
33. See id. at 570-71.  A question not addressed at this point is how one de-
termines the government’s purpose.  Another contentious question is whether
courts should inquire about the government’s actual purpose or motivation, or
whether courts should limit themselves to the government’s asserted purpose.
Also, should the court hypothesize potential purposes for the government?  The
Court’s answer to these questions varies depending on the type of classification
involved.  With race and gender classifications, the Court will make some effort to
determine whether the government’s asserted purpose is just a pretext for race or
gender bias.  For most other classifications, however, the Court will accept the
government’s asserted purpose and, in some cases, might even hypothesize a
permissible government purpose in support of the law.  See FCC v. Beach Com-
munications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (requiring only a reasonably conceiv-
able state of facts that could provide a rational basis for a classification).  But see
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (refusing to find
a rational basis for city government’s actions).
34. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 565 (3d ed. 1996).
35. See id.
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government’s purpose permissible? — can be quite strict if the
government is limited to a small number of purposes.  For exam-
ple, the government could be strictly limited to only “important”
or “compelling” purposes, such as addressing a national emergency
or remedying past oppression.  Conversely, the first question can
be quite lenient if the government is allowed to pursue a broad
range of purposes.  For example, the set of permissible purposes
could be defined broadly, such as any reason other than a bare de-
sire to harm the burdened group.  So, to decide an equal protection
case like Beazer, we must know what range of ends government
may pursue and whether “public safety” falls within that range.
The second step of federal equal protection analysis also var-
ies in the amount of scrutiny a court will apply.  The fit question
will be stricter if we require a tighter means-end fit than if we allow
a looser fit.  At one extreme, a perfect fit between means and end
may be required.  In Beazer, a “perfect fit” would mean that
methadone use is a perfect proxy for worker safety because all
methadone users are unsafe workers and all non-methadone users
are safe workers.  Rarely, though, is a classification a perfect proxy
for the government’s purpose.  Indeed, the evidence in Beazer
showed that not all methadone users were unsafe workers and that
some people who did not use methadone were unsafe workers.36
Thus, the Transit Authority policy was over-inclusive to the extent
it applied to people who did not threaten the government’s pur-
pose (i.e., methadone users who would be safe workers);37 and it
was under-inclusive to the extent it did not apply to people who did
threaten the government’s purpose (i.e., non-methadone users who
would be unsafe workers).38  The main question under step two will
be how much over- and under-inclusiveness should be tolerated
before a law will be rejected because it does not fit the govern-
ment’s purpose.
A pure means-end analysis raises many difficult policy ques-
tions.  First, any assessment of fit must consider whether the gov-
ernment had an alternative that could have reduced the over- or
under-inclusiveness of the challenged law.  Second, even if alterna-
tives existed, one must consider the relative cost of such alterna-
tives.  For example, in Beazer, the government could have per-
formed a detailed evaluation of each applicant’s potential safety
36. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 589-92.
37. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 9.1.2, at 531-32; TRIBE, supra note 15,
§ 16-4, at 1449.
38. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 9.1.2, at 531; TRIBE, supra note 15, §
16-4, at 1447.
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record.39  Yet such individual consideration would impose great
costs on the government, and the Transit Authority believed that it
was more efficient to use general categories as a proxy for safety.40
Third, one must evaluate the cost of not achieving a better fit.  For
example, the Transit Authority policy in Beazer was both under-
and over-inclusive, which means that the policy both allowed hiring
of unsafe workers and prevented the hiring of safe workers.41  Each
of these errors are a cost of the program.
A pure means-end analysis requires careful identification,
weighting, and balancing of costs and benefits.42  In the abstract, a
court is ill-equipped to quantify these costs and benefits or to bal-
ance their relative weight.43  Courts do not have the investigative or
fact-finding capacity to gather data on a law’s costs and benefits.44
39. See STONE ET AL., supra note 34, at 568 (discussing the “administrative
costs” of obtaining a greater fit).
40. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 590-91.
41. See id. at 518.
42. See id. (noting that cost-benefit analysis “requires an assessment of both
the importance of the state’s goal and the degree to which the classification ad-
vances it”).
43. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1975) (The legislature “has the ability to make either
rough or finely tuned distinctions, justified by practical considerations though
perhaps not by principle, in a manner not generally thought open to a court.”); see
generally Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme
Court Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War
Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337 (1984) (discussing relative strengths
and weaknesses of courts and legislatures regarding empirical analysis).
44. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 43, at 28 (“Congress has . . . a special
ability to develop and consider the factual basis of a problem.”).  One commenta-
tor summarizes the main points as follows:
[A court] may feel that evaluating statutes based on scientific factfinding
is unwise, especially if it results in striking down legislation as unconsti-
tutional.  In McKleskey v. Kemp, the Court stated that legislatures were
better qualified than the Court to evaluate statistical studies.  Legisla-
tures and agencies have ready access to scientific experts and do not face
the immediate problems of deciding disputes.  Furthermore, the Court’s
reliance on the adversary system may produce expert opinions that are
highly polarized.
Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 OR. L. REV.
111, 129-30 (1997); see also McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987); Bert
Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 679
(1988); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12
(1998) (“The capability of the courts to conduct scientific or social scientific  re-
search is extremely limited, and perhaps nil.”); Sheldon L. Trubatch, Informed
Judicial Decision-Making: A Suggestion for a Judicial Office for Understanding
Science and Technology, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 255 (1985).  The Supreme Court
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Also, courts, at least in constitutional cases, are not charged with
deciding the best trade-off between policy and efficiency.45  Pure
means-end analysis is the sort of decision-making that is urged on
legislatures and administrative agencies, who are charged with
finding the “best” solution to real world problems.46
Perhaps because pure means-end analysis has few, if any, jus-
ticiable standards, the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine
does not use such a method.  Rather, means-end analysis is used as
a tool for determining whether government has acted out of preju-
dice or bias.47  The remainder of this Part analyzes how the Court
has performed this analysis for three types of classifications: (1)
race, ethnicity, and alienage, (2) gender, and (3) all other classifica-
tions.
B. Laws that Classify Based on Race, Ethnicity, or Alienage
When the government classifies people based on race, ethnic-
ity, or alienage, the Court applies its most stringent version of the
two-step equal protection test.48  The specific test, known as “strict
scrutiny,” allows very few permissible purposes — only those that
are “compelling” — and requires a tight fit between means and
end.  A racial classification must be “narrowly tailored” or
“necessary” to achieve the government’s compelling purpose.49
                                                                                                                                
has made the same point about economic analysis: “[T]he Court is institutionally
unsuited to gather the facts upon which economic predictions can be made, and
professionally untrained to make them.”  General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519
U.S. 278, 308 (1997).
45. See articles cited supra note 44.
46. See id.
47. See Rubenfeld, supra note 22, at 428, 436-37.  Professor Rubenfeld calls
this the “smoking out” approach to equal protection review because the means-
end test is used to reveal any improper government motive.  See id.
48. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 9.3.2, at 550-52; TRIBE, supra note 15,
§ 16-6, at 1451-54; R. Randall Kelso, Filling Gaps in the Supreme Court’s Ap-
proach to Constitutional Review of Legislation: Standards, Ends, and Burdens Re-
considered, 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 493, 497, 506-07 (1992).
49. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 9.3.2, at 550-52; TRIBE, supra note 15,
§ 16-6, at 1451-54; Kelso, supra note 48, at 506-07.  The Court also applies strict
scrutiny to laws that discriminate in regulation of a fundamental right.  See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 10.1, at 638-44.  These fundamental rights are
rights protected by some other provision of the Constitution, such as the Bill of
Rights or the Due Process Clause.  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (“It is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws.”).  For a good part of this century, however, the Court experimented
with recognizing unenumerated fundamental rights under the Equal Protection
Clause.  See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
MCGREAL.QUALITY2.DOC 11/13/98  10:37 AM
222 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [15:2
The Court applies such searching scrutiny to racial classifications
for three main reasons.  First, a person’s race rarely is relevant to
government action.50  With a few exceptions, such as remedying
race discrimination, government can (and should) regulate without
reference to race.51  Second, and related to the first point, when
government has used race in the past, it was often to oppress or
harm a disfavored racial group.52  Given our history, courts are
automatically suspicious of any government use of race to distin-
guish among citizens.53  It is for this reason that race is referred to
as a “suspect class” for purposes of equal protection; government’s
use of race to classify people is inherently suspect.54  Third, racial
minorities may have difficulty redressing government wrongs
through the political system.55  The needs or views of a racial mi-
                                                                                                                                
(protecting right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause); Skinner v. Okla-
homa ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (protecting right to procreate under
the Equal Protection Clause).  The fundamental rights prong of equal protection
is not within the scope of this Article.
50. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (noting
that race is a “classification long recognized as ‘in most circumstances irrelevant
and therefore prohibited.’”) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
100 (1943)); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
51. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227-28.
52. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state law prohibiting inter-
racial marriages between whites and blacks); Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (racially segregated public elementary schools); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (state statute excluding blacks from jury service).
53. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(“[R]ace, alienage, or national origin  . . .  are so seldom relevant to the achieve-
ment of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy — a view that those in the burdened
class are not as worthy or deserving as others.”).
54. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-24 (expressing “skepticism” of all racial clas-
sifications); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal re-
strictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect.”).
55. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“[Race] discrimination is unlikely to be
soon rectified by legislative means.”).  The Court’s most famous articulation of
this point came in dicta in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938).  In his infamous footnote four, Justice Harlan F. Stone ex-
plained that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political proc-
esses ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”  Id. at n.4 (emphasis added); see
generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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nority group may be ignored by the political process due to the
bias, prejudice, indifference, or ignorance of the majority.56
Only once in our constitutional history, in Korematsu v.
United States,57 has the Court upheld a racial classification under
strict scrutiny.  Korematsu addressed the constitutionality of the
American internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry during
World War II.58  Based on factual contentions that since have been
discredited,59 the Court deferred to the military’s judgment that in-
ternment of all Japanese-Americans was necessary to protect na-
tional security.60  According to the military, many Japanese-
Americans were loyal to Japan’s war effort against the United
States and, acting on that loyalty, might try to sabotage the United
States’ war effort from within the nation’s borders.61  Given the
gravity of the threat and the urgency of the situation, the military
argued that it was not feasible to hold hearings or perform inquir-
ies into the loyalty of individual citizens.62  Thus, it was necessary
to intern all Japanese-Americans as a prophylactic measure.63
The Court upheld the military’s internment policy, largely de-
ferring to the military’s judgment.64  Korematsu both is and is not
an aberration.  For constitutional cases involving the military, Ko-
rematsu is not an aberration.  The Court has deferred to the mili-
tary in many areas, creating what might be called a military excep-
tion to the Constitution.65  For equal protection cases, however,
Korematsu is an aberration.  Members of the Court have since
heaped disparagement on that case, leaving it as the one instance
in which a racial classification has survived strict scrutiny.66  To un-
56. See ELY, supra note 55, at 135-79.
57. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
58. See generally id.
59. See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 229-41 (2d ed. 1996).
60. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (1944).
61. See id. at 218-19.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 219.
65. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding military
regulation that prohibited wearing headgear indoors against challenge by serv-
iceman whose religious practices required that he wear a yarmulke indoors);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding exclusion of women from the
military draft).
66. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 212-15, 275 (“A Korematsu-type classification, as
I read the opinions in this case, will never again survive strict scrutiny: such a clas-
sification, history and precedent instruct, properly ranks as prohibited.”)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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derstand why, consider how strict scrutiny applies to the facts of
Korematsu.  First, the military must have had a compelling reason
to intern Japanese-Americans. There is little doubt that preventing
internal sabotage of the nation’s war effort was such a purpose.67
Indeed, self-preservation could be characterized as the most basic,
fundamental power of a nation.  Second, the military had to show
that interning Japanese-Americans was “necessary” or “narrowly
tailored” to achieving that purpose.  Here, the military should have
foundered.  Recall that this second step — the fit question — asks
whether there is an empirical relationship between the govern-
ment’s purpose (detecting disloyal individuals who pose a threat of
sabotage) and the government’s classification (Japanese-
Americans).  In Korematsu, the military should have had to show
that substantially all Japanese-American citizens are disloyal.  If
this was not so, then interning all Japanese-American citizens was
not necessary to protect the war effort.  Instead, the government
should more narrowly have tailored its policy to identify those
Japanese-American citizens (as well as American citizens of other
ethnicities) that were likely to be disloyal.  The definition of Japa-
nese ancestry as an accurate proxy for disloyalty was, as some mili-
tary and government officials who spoke at the time said, based on
racial prejudice.68
Since Korematsu, the Court has been much more demanding
under strict scrutiny.  First, the Court has recognized one other
compelling government purpose.  In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena69 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,70 the Court held
that government has a compelling reason to remedy identified past
67. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
68. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 59, at 232-34; see also Nanette Dembitz,
Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court’s Korematsu
and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175, 195-97 (1945) (discussing the well-
known history of West Coast prejudice against people of Japanese descent);
Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases — A Disaster, 54 Yale L.J. 489,
489 (1945) (suggesting that the Japanese internment “was calculated to produce
both individual injustice and deep-seated social maladjustments of a cumulative
and sinister kind” (citations omitted)).  The dissenters in Korematsu recognized
that the military’s internment policy “falls into the ugly abyss of racism.”  Kore-
matsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  In addition, Congress has recog-
nized the injustice of the internment policy by enacting a statute intended to
make reparations to those harmed.  See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. §
1989a (“Congress recognizes that  . . .  a grave injustice was done to both citizens
and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation,
and internment of civilians during World War II.”).
69. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
70. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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discrimination.71  To do so legitimately, however, the government
must have some basis for concluding that either the government
itself has discriminated in the past, or that specific private actors or
groups of private actors have discriminated in the recent past.72
For example, states have a compelling interest in remedying past
racial discrimination in their school systems.73  Also, governments
have a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination in a
local industry, such as construction contracting.74  Government
may not, however, use race to remedy unspecified societal dis-
crimination.75  Rather, government must have some evidence that
specific discrimination has occurred.76
On the second step, the fit question, no racial classification
has ever passed the strict “necessary” or “narrowly tailored” test.
In applying the test, the Court has tolerated very little over- or un-
der-inclusiveness in racial classifications.  For example, if a city
claims that a particular industry in the city has discriminated based
on race, the city may not remedy this discrimination by merely set-
ting aside a specified percentage of public contracts in that indus-
try for members of the disadvantaged race.77  Such a blanket racial
set-aside is too over- and under-inclusive to survive strict scrutiny.78
The set-aside is too over-inclusive because it may benefit firms that
did not suffer from discrimination; it is under-inclusive because it
71. See Adarand 515 U.S. at 237; Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
72. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (“The unhappy persistence of both the prac-
tice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in
this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from
acting in response to it.”); Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (holding that a state may
“tak[e] action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdic-
tion”).
73. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (mandating
use of race-conscious means to remedy prior public school segregation).
74. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.  In Croson, the Court states:
If the City of Richmond had evidence before it that the nonminority
contractors were systematically excluding minority businesses from sub-
contracting opportunities it could take action to end the discriminatory
exclusion. . . . In the extreme case, some form of narrowly tailored racial
preference might be necessary to break down patterns of deliberate ex-
clusion.
Id.
75. See id. at 498-99.
76. See id. at 500 (holding that government must have a “strong basis in evi-
dence” for concluding that a race-based remedy is necessary (quoting Wygnant v.
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion))).
77. See id. at 507-08.
78. See id.
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may not benefit firms that did suffer from discrimination.79  To sur-
vive strict scrutiny, the government must try more carefully to
identify minority firms that suffered from past discrimination.80  As
in Korematsu, where race should not have served as a proxy for
disloyalty, in these later cases, race alone cannot serve as a proxy
for past discrimination.
In short, strict scrutiny has two hallmarks: very few permissi-
ble government purposes and very tight fit between those purposes
and the means used to achieve them.  The stringency of this test
has led some commentators and judges to complain that strict scru-
tiny is “strict in theory but fatal in fact.”81  While some Justices pro-
test that characterization,82 the cases bear out the observation.
That fact is not surprising given the central mission of equal pro-
tection: to identify laws enacted out of bare dislike.  Again, con-
sider the reasons we are suspicious of racial classifications.
First, because of our nation’s poor history with racial classifi-
cations, courts cast a suspicious eye on such laws.  Strict scrutiny is
designed to “smoke out” laws that claim to use race for benign rea-
sons — such as to remedy past discrimination — but really serve
another, more nefarious purpose.83  Coming to the case with a
healthy suspicion, judges should be alarmed when a racial classifi-
cation is over- or under-inclusive.  For example, poor fit should
cause a judge to think
If the government really intended to remedy past discrimination,
this law would have been drafted to target those who have suf-
fered past discrimination.  Since the law is not so tailored, and I
am already suspicious of racial classifications, I have good reason
79. See id. at 507-10.
80. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43
UCLA L. Rev. 1745 (1996) (distinguishing Adarand-like set-asides from Bakke-
like affirmative action); Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1781
(1996) (discussing what types of affirmative action programs satisfy the narrow
tailoring requirement, or are narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination).
81. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in
the judgment); See also TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1451; Gunther, supra note 16, at
8.
82. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“[W]e wish
to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”
(quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519)).
83. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“[T]he
purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that the legislative body is pursuing  a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool.”).
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to fear that another reason — such as a naked racial preference
— is the real reason for this law.84
The fit question serves to confirm or dispel the court’s suspicion of
racial bias.
Second, the Court sees good reason to act on even a suspicion
that a racial classification rests on an impermissible purpose.
Given our national history, racial classifications are a dangerous
tool, much like a laser.  When used precisely and thoughtfully, such
tools can achieve great good.  But, used haphazardly and thought-
lessly, such tools can cause unintended harm, and might cause
more harm than good.85  So, to prevent unintended harm and
smoke out pretextual laws, the Court uses strict scrutiny.
In sum, strict scrutiny follows the general form of equal pro-
tection analysis suggested earlier.  First, the Court brings a healthy
suspicion to all laws that classify based on race.  Second, the Court
uses the two-step means-end equal protection test to either dispel
or confirm that suspicion.  The next section explains how the
Court’s gender cases follow the same method.
C. Laws that Classify Based on Gender
The Court’s gender discrimination cases have followed a tor-
turous path.  For most of its history, the Court has interpreted the
Equal Protection Clause to provide no special protection to
women.86  During that period, the Court upheld laws excluding
women from jobs as varied as bartending and the practice of law.87
Even Chief Justice Earl Warren, author and architect of Brown v.
Board of Education,88 voted to uphold a state law that excluded
women from jury service unless they specifically requested to
serve.89  Throughout this era, the Court’s decisions were based on
the Justices’ stereotypical view of women’s roles.  For example, in
84. Id.  Of course, the Court has not always been suspicious of racial classifi-
cations; the justices’ attitudes toward race evolved over time (as did society’s atti-
tudes).  See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity as Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365,
1421-26 (1997).
85. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94.
86. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW 163 (1988).
87. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding law that prevented
women from acting as bartenders unless they were the spouse or daughter of the
tavern owner); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (“The paramount des-
tiny and mission of woman [sic] are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother.  This is the law of the Creator.”) (Bradley, J., concurring).
88. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
89. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 69 (1961).
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upholding the exclusion of women from the practice of law, the
Court wrote:
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life.  The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly be-
longs to the domain and functions of womanhood.  The har-
mony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or
should belong, to the family institution, is repugnant to the idea
of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that
of her husband.90
In upholding the exemption from jury service, the Court wrote:
[W]oman is still regarded as the center of home and family life.
We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for a
State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that a
woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service
unless she herself determines that such service is consistent with
her own special responsibilities.91
All in all, the Court saw no problem with government enacting its
vision of women’s place in society.92  The premise seemed to be
that if some stereotype had a kernel of truth — i.e., was descrip-
tively accurate for some women — it was permissible to mandate
that stereotype for all.  Of course, that is the nature of stereotypes
— the unjustified generalization of some instances are applied to
an entire group.  The Court never was suspicious of such laws be-
cause its members — all men — saw the government’s view of
women’s role as natural, not biased or prejudiced.93
90. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141.
91. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62.
92. See id.
93. Professor Lawrence Lessig calls such a consensus of viewpoints an
“uncontested discourse.”  See Lessig, supra note 84, at 1393.  An “uncontested
discourse” is a discourse where:
[P]eople don’t, in the main, disagree about fundamentals.  In the main,
they don’t think about fundamentals at all.  People act, or argue, instead,
taking these fundamentals for granted.  . . . One could conceivably ques-
tion fundamentals; one could legitimately express doubt.  But if one in-
sisted upon these doubts, or was relentless in these questions, then one
would mark oneself as odd; somehow outside the discourse.
Id.  The world view expressed in cases like Bradwell and Goesaert was uncon-
tested at the time because those making the decisions held the same view.  A con-
tested discourse, on the other hand, is “a discourse where fundamentals in that
discourse appear up for grabs; that participants in that discourse acknowledge the
legitimacy of disagreement about these fundamentals; that disagreement is a sign
of normalcy for a participant, not oddness.”  Id.
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In its modern cases, the Court has been increasingly suspi-
cious of gender classifications.  Undoubtedly, this suspicion has re-
sulted from the changing views of gender held by members of the
Court.  The views of gender quoted in the preceding paragraph no
longer seem normal, but instead seem offensive.  Professor Law-
rence Lessig calls such a change in viewpoint a shift in the uncon-
tested discourse on gender.94  At the time of the earlier cases, the
uncontested discourse on gender held that women’s natural realm
was the home.95
As time passed, people’s view of gender slowly changed.  For
example, the Court in Hoyt v. Florida upheld the exclusion of
women from juries, but noted that women’s roles were changing.96
The discourse on gender was in a state of change or, as Professor
Lessig describes it, the discourse of gender now was contested.97
In the last two decades, the Court seems to have settled into a
new uncontested discourse on gender — gender classifications are
suspicious because they likely reflect gender bias or unthinking
gender stereotypes.  The remainder of this section explains how
the Court’s modern cases reflect this new uncontested discourse,
and how the Court incorporates that discourse into the equal pro-
tection method outlined above.
The modern era of gender cases began with Reed v. Reed,98
where the Court applied the lowest level of equal protection re-
view — rational basis review — to a law that preferred men over
women as the administrator of estates.99  The Court struck down
the law because it saw no permissible reason for the law’s gender
preference.100  The state argued that the preference would save
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1416 (The justices “didn’t even think it ‘debatable’ whether sex
discrimination was justified.  Indeed, for many, the discriminations of the time
would not have appeared as ‘discriminations,’ just as for us, the discriminations in
the minimum driving age don’t appear to us as ‘discrimination’ against chil-
dren.”).
96. See Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 61-62 (noting “[d]espite the enlightened emancipa-
tion of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their
entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to
men, woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life”).
97. See Lessig, supra note 84, at 1426.
98. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
99. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 75-76.  The law designated categories of people who
were eligible to administer an estate.  See id. at 72-73.  For example, one category
was “mother or father” of the decedent.  Id. at 73.  Whenever a man and a woman
were both in an eligible category, the statute instructed the courts to prefer the
man.  Id.
100. See id. at 76.
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administrative costs because it would prevent a hearing to select an
administrator when both a man and a woman were eligible.101  The
Court rejected this argument, holding that the government’s pur-
pose must have some relation to gender.102  There was nothing
about excluding women, as opposed to men, that advanced the
state’s purpose; excluding men would have equally achieved the
government’s purpose.  Thus, the choice to prefer men over
women was arbitrary, and the law was unconstitutional.103
While the Court applied only rational basis review in Reed, it
identified what has become the central question in gender dis-
crimination cases: To what extent must gender correlate with a
government purpose before the government can use gender as a
proxy for its purpose?  In Reed, neither gender had any special
correlation with cost savings.104  In terms of the Court’s equal pro-
tection analysis, both genders fit the government’s purpose equally
well.  In future cases, the question would be whether a statistical
correlation between one gender and a government’s purpose
would be enough to satisfy equal protection.
The Court began answering that question in Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson.105  In Frontiero, a servicewoman challenged a federal law
governing benefits for military personnel.106 The law automatically
granted male military personnel additional benefits on account of a
spouse, but denied such benefits to female military personnel un-
less a servicewoman could prove that her spouse in fact was de-
pendant upon her for more than half of his support.107  As in Reed,
the government’s sole justification for the gender classification was
administrative convenience.108  The government argued that
“Congress might reasonably have concluded that it would be both
cheaper and easier simply conclusively to presume that wives of
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. (“[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the
merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause .”).
104. See id.
105. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
106. See id. (challenging 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (1970); 37 U.S.C. §§ 101, 401,
403 (1970)).
107. See 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (providing additional benefits if a serviceper-
son had “dependent” and defined “dependent” to include a spouse).  The statute,
however, also provided that “A person is not a dependent of a female member [of
the military] unless he is in fact dependent on her for over one-half of his sup-
port.”  See id.
108. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688.
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male members are financially dependant upon their husbands,
while burdening female members with the task of establishing de-
pendency in fact.”109  Thus, Frontiero differed from Reed in an im-
portant respect: Whereas in Reed neither gender had greater cor-
relation with the government’s purpose, in Frontiero, gender did
have some statistical correlation with the government’s purpose.
The question was whether some statistical correlation was enough
to pass the fitness test.
The Court once again struck down the law.110  All but one jus-
tice analogized the law to Reed and concluded that the gender clas-
sification was unconstitutional.111  The Justices divided, however,
on the proper version of the equal protection analysis to apply.112
Four Justices held that strict scrutiny should apply to gender dis-
crimination.113  These Justices argued that gender and race dis-
crimination shared similar histories and operated in similar ways
and thus should receive the same level of scrutiny.114  Three Jus-
tices believed that the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny
did not need to be answered because the federal statute was un-
constitutional even under the most lenient test.115  The remaining
Justice applied the most lenient test.116
Frontiero raises several important points that have recurred
throughout the Court’s treatment of gender discrimination.  First,
some alleged correlation between gender and the government’s
purpose may be purely a product of stereotype and have no statis-
tical basis.  These are easy cases — the gender classification cannot
stand.  Second, statistical correlation between gender and some
state of facts — such as between gender and dependence on a
spouse’s income — may be the result of stereotypes and past dis-
crimination.  Societal stereotypes about women’s proper roles may
have led to gender discrimination in the workplace that led to the
statistical correlation argued in Frontiero.  Once again, these gen-
der distinctions are socially constructed and have no necessary
109. Id. at 689.
110. See id. at 690-91.
111. See id. at 690-91; see id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring); see id. (Powell, J.,
concurring).  Then-Justice William Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the
government’s statistics gave Congress a rational basis to distinguish between men
and women.  See id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (citing Frontiero v. Laird,
341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Ala. 1972)).
112. See id. at 691.
113. See id. at 688.
114. See id. at 684-88.
115. See id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
116. See id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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connection to gender.  The issue is what action the government
permissibly may base on such statistics.  Frontiero suggests that the
Court will invalidate laws based on such statistics if the Justices
believe that government intended to either disadvantage women or
reinforce existing gender stereotypes.117
The Court picked up the thread of Frontiero in its next gender
case, Craig v. Boren.118  Craig involved a state law prohibiting pur-
chase of 3.2 percent beer by women under age eighteen and men
under age twenty-one.119  The state argued that the law was in-
tended to protect the safety of public roadways by decreasing
drunk driving.120  According to the state, the different age limits
were justified by statistics showing that men between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one were more than ten times as likely as
women the same age to be arrested for drunk driving.121  Once
again, the question was whether statistical correlation between
gender and the state’s purpose was a sufficient fit for the equal
protection analysis.122
In reviewing the state beer law, the Court finally settled on a
definition of the two-step equal protection test for gender dis-
crimination cases: (1) the government action must serve an
“important” purpose, and (2) the gender classification must be
“substantially related” to achieving the government’s important
purpose.123  With little analysis, the Court quickly concluded that
public safety was an important government purpose.124  The more
difficult question was whether the statistical correlation between
gender and drunk driving showed that the gender classification was
“substantially related” to public safety.125
If taken at face value, the fit question would be problematic.
No vague label — whether it be “necessary,” “narrowly tailored,”
“substantially related,” or “rationally related” — can answer this
question.  Rather, those labels merely suggest relative degrees of
fit — “necessary” is tighter than “substantially related,” which is
117. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (“[Gender] classifi-
cations may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, so-
cial, and economic inferiority of women.”).
118. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
119. See id. at 191-92.
120. See id. at 199-201.
121. See id. at 201.
122. See id. at 200.
123. See id. at 197.
124. See id. at 199-200 (“Clearly, the protection of public health and safety rep-
resents an important function of state and local governments.”).
125. See id. at 200-04.
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tighter than “rationally related.”  Yet, because fit is inherently a
question of degree, no real dividing lines exist.  Any attempt to set
some sort of percentage would be arbitrary, and, without some sort
of statistical cut-off, we are left with gestalt judgments — like those
made by legislators — about the desirability of a law’s over- and
under-inclusiveness.  Legislators presumably consider whether it is
feasible to reduce the over- or under-inclusiveness when framing
legislation.  Standing alone, then, fit does not seem susceptible to
justiciable standards.
As discussed above, however, the equal protection fit question
does not operate as an independent test. 126  Rather, the fit question
serves to confirm or dispel the Court’s suspicion that something is
wrong with the statute.  Recall how fit worked in strict scrutiny of
racial classifications.  In those cases, the Court came to the case
with a strong suspicion that any racial classification was meant to
disadvantage a racial group.  To uphold the law, the Court asks for
some significant reason other than prejudice — a compelling gov-
ernment purpose — for the discriminatory law.  If the racial classi-
fication does not sufficiently fit that purpose, then the Court has
confirmed its suspicion that the law likely is based on racial preju-
dice and that the government’s asserted purpose is a pretext.127
The fit question operates the same way in gender discrimina-
tion cases.  The Court has noted on several occasions that the state
and federal governments historically have discriminated based on
gender.128  Given this star-crossed past, the Court brings a healthy
suspicion to laws that classify based on gender, though the suspi-
cion may not be as pronounced as in race discrimination cases.129
The fit question then confirms or dispels the Court’s suspicion.
Poor fit may indicate that the law is based on gender bias or on an
unthinking endorsement of a gender stereotype.
The question remains whether and, if so, when a statistical
correlation between gender and the government’s purpose will
dispel the Court’s suspicion.  Craig provides guidance on these
questions.  Recall that the Court accepted public safety as an im-
portant public purpose.130  The question was whether statistics that
showed that two percent of men aged eighteen to twenty-one were
arrested for drunk driving while only .18% of women the same age
126. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
128. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 529-32 (1996); Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 n.10 (1982); Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-88 (1973).
129. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.
130. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-200.
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were arrested for the same offense justified the statute’s gender
distinction.131  The Court noted that these statistics clearly showed
that eighteen to twenty-one year old men were arrested for drunk
driving substantially more often than women of the same age.132
But, for the Court, the relevant question was not whether the evi-
dence showed some measurable difference between men and
women relating to the government’s purpose, but whether one
gender (and not the other) had some necessary, inherent connec-
tion with the government’s purpose.133  The Court explained:
“Certainly if maleness is to serve as a proxy for drinking and driv-
ing, a correlation of two percent must be considered an unduly
tenuous ‘fit.’”134  Thus, instead of asking whether men posed a
greater drunk driving risk than women, the Court asked whether
men aged eighteen to twenty-one as a class are necessarily predis-
posed to drive while drunk.  A showing that two percent of men
aged eighteen to twenty-one were arrested for drunk driving did
not suffice.135
The lack of fit once again confirmed the Court’s suspicion that
gender stereotypes were at work.136  The Court explained: “The
very social stereotypes that find reflection in age-differential laws
are likely substantially to distort the accuracy of [the govern-
ment’s] statistics.  Hence ‘reckless’ young men who drink and drive
are transformed into arrest statistics, whereas their female coun-
terparts are chivalrously escorted home.”137  Given that the drunk
driving was not associated closely with either gender,138 the Court
feared that gender stereotypes were driving the law.
Reed, Frontiero, and Craig illustrate how the Court uses the fit
question to confirm or dispel its suspicion of gender bias.  Later
cases reveal, however, that, unlike race classifications, the Court is
not suspicious of all gender classifications.  Instead, the Court fol-
lows two different approaches.  First, if the Court believes that
government sincerely is trying to remedy the effects of past gender
131. See id. at 200-01.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 201 (“While such a disparity is not trivial in a statistical sense, it
hardly can form the basis for employment of a gender line as a classifying de-
vice.”).
134. Id. at 201-02.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 202 n.14.
137. Id. (citations omitted).
138. See id. at 204 (“Suffice to say that the showing offered by the appellees
does not satisfy us that sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regula-
tion of drinking and driving.”).
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discrimination, the Court will allow government to act on a statisti-
cal correlation between gender and the government’s purpose.139
For example, in one case, the Court believed that the state was
trying to remedy past employment discrimination by awarding
widows (but not widowers) a special property tax exemption.140
Thus, the Court allowed the government to rely on statistics that
showed that on average women in similar occupations earned less
than men.141
Second, if the Court believes that government is pursuing
some other purpose, the Court will require a tight fit — perhaps
tighter than strict scrutiny — between gender and the govern-
ment’s purpose.  For example, in Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan,142 the Court did not believe that the government was
trying to help women.143  In that case, the state’s only nursing pro-
gram limited enrollment to women.144  The government argued that
the admission policy was intended to compensate for past dis-
crimination against women in the field of nursing.145  Barely con-
taining its incredulity, the Court rejected this purpose, noting that
historically, in Mississippi alone, more than ninety percent of all
registered nurses were women.146  According to the Court, Missis-
sippi’s asserted purpose was a mask for its actual purpose — chan-
neling women into traditionally female careers.147  Since the Court
believed that the state was acting based on stereotype, the Court
could not rely on the statistical correlation between gender and
nursing.148
139. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977); Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199, 223-24 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643,
648 (1975).
140. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
141. See id. at 353 (“Whether from overt discrimination or from the socializa-
tion process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the
women seeking any but the lowest paid job.”); see also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding federal statute that allowed servicewomen more time
than servicemen to obtain promotion; statute was intended to compensate for
past discrimination against women in the military).
142. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
143. See id. at 727-31.
144. See id. at 720.
145. See id. at 727 (“The State’s primary justification for maintaining the single
sex admissions policy of MUW’s School of Nursing is that it compensates for dis-
crimination against women and, therefore, constitutes educational affirmative ac-
tion.”).
146. See id. at 729.  Nationally, the figure was 98.6%.  Id.
147. See id. at 729-30.
148. See id.
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Much rides on whether the Court believes that the govern-
ment’s use of gender genuinely is remedial.  It is not always clear,
however, on what basis the Court forms its belief.  Regardless,
whether the Court is suspicious of the government’s motives will
affect how the fit test applies.  If the Court is suspicious, it will look
for a tight fit to dispel that suspicion; if not, the Court will accept a
loose fit.
The Court’s most recent gender equal protection decision,
United States v. Virginia,149 is an excellent illustration of the meth-
odology suggested by this Article.  This case involved the Virginia
Military Institute’s policy of excluding women.150  The Court began
by noting that it may view all gender classifications with a suspi-
cion borne of history:
Today’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or op-
portunities based on sex responds to volumes of history.  As a
plurality of this Court recognized a generation ago, “our Nation
has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”
Through a century plus three decades or more of that history,
women did not count among voters composing “We the People”;
not until 1920 did women gain a constitutional right to the fran-
chise.  And for half a century thereafter, it remained the pre-
vailing doctrine that government, both federal and state, could
withhold from women opportunities accorded men so long as
any “basis in reason” could be conceived for the discrimina-
tion.151
Note the parallels to the race discrimination cases.  First, the Court
refers to the history of gender discrimination, just as it has relied
on the history of race discrimination.152  Second, the Court recounts
the political exclusion of women throughout most of American his-
tory, similar to the experience of racial minorities.153  Third, the
Court states that this background makes it “skeptical” of state law;
the Court has used exactly the same term to explain how it views
race classifications.154  The two-step equal protection analysis will
either confirm or dispel the Court’s skeptical suspicions.
The purpose and fit questions work together to test whether
the government actually has an independent justification for its ac-
tion.  As the Court explained, “Our precedent instructs that
‘benign’ justifications proffered in defense of categorical exclu-
sions will not be accepted automatically; a tenable justification
149. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
150. See id. at 520.
151. Id. at 531 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
152. See id. at 532-32.
153. See id.
154. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223 (1995).
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must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions
in fact differently grounded.”155  If the purpose has a close fit with
reality, then the government has dispelled the Court’s strong sus-
picion; if not, the Court’s suspicion is confirmed and the law is un-
constitutional.
Virginia offered two justifications for the Virginia Military In-
stitute (“VMI”) admission policy: (1) single-sex education, as of-
fered at VMI, is part of a larger effort to offer diverse public edu-
cation opportunities, and (2) admitting women would necessarily
require VMI to alter or abolish its unique method of training.156
The Court held that a blanket gender classification fit neither pur-
pose.157  First, concerning educational diversity, VMI was the only
single-sex public higher education facility in the state.158  Indeed,
while VMI decided to remain single-sex, there was a “movement
of all other public colleges and universities in Virginia away from
single-sex education.”159  If the state were sincere about providing
diverse educational opportunities for all citizens, it would have
done so evenhandedly, providing similar single-sex educational fa-
cilities for both men and women.160  Thus, VMI’s poor fit with the
155. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535.
156. Id.  VMI uses what it calls the “adversative method of training,” which the
Court described as follows:
VMI produces its “citizen-soldiers” through “an adversative, or doubt-
ing, model of education” which features “[p]hysical rigor, mental stress,
absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of
behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values.”  As one Commandant
of Cadets described it, the adversative method “dissects the young stu-
dent,” and makes him aware of his “limits and capabilities,” so that he
knows “how far he can go with his anger, . . . how much he can take un-
der stress, . . . exactly what he can do when he is physically exhausted.”
VMI cadets live in spartan barracks where surveillance is constant
and privacy nonexistent; they wear uniforms, eat together in the mess
hall, and regularly participate in drills.  Entering students are incessantly
exposed to the rat line, “An extreme form of the adversative model,”
comparable in intensity to Marine Corps boot camp.  Tormenting and
punishing, the rat line bonds new cadets to their fellow sufferers and,
when they have completed the 7-month experience, to their former tor-
mentors.
VMI’s “Adversative model” is further characterized by a hierarchical
“class system” of privileges and responsibilities, a “dyke system” for as-
signing a senior class mentor to each entering class “rat,” and a strin-
gently enforced “honor code,” which prescribes that a cadet “does not
lie, cheat, steal nor tolerate those who do.”
Id. at 522 (citations omitted).
157. See id. at 539, 546.
158. See id. at 539.
159. Id.
160. See id.
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purpose of educational diversity could not dispel the Court’s suspi-
cion of gender discrimination.161
The state’s second purpose — preserving VMI’s unique edu-
cational method — also failed the fit analysis.162  While the district
court focused on the fact that women, on average, were less likely
than men either to want VMI’s training method or to be able to
handle the method, the Court focused on the fact that per se exclu-
sion of women was over-inclusive because some women would be
willing and able to pursue VMI’s training method.163  And these
women should not be denied opportunities on account of the aver-
age abilities or preferences of women as a whole: “State actors
controlling gates to opportunity . . . may not exclude qualified in-
dividuals based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities
of males and females.’”164  If willing and able women are excluded,
that exclusion apparently is based on some stereotypical view of
women’s place in society.165  Once again, the poor fit between gen-
der and the government’s purpose confirms the Court’s suspicion
of gender bias.
In sum, the Court’s gender cases follow the same method as
its race cases — the Court uses the two-step means-end analysis to
confirm or dispel its suspicion of prejudice.  The Court, however, is
not automatically suspicious of gender classifications.  In cases
where the Court is less suspicious, it is more likely that the Court
will find that the government genuinely wants to remedy past gen-
der discrimination, and the statute will be upheld.
D. And the Rest: All Other Classifications
The Court reviews all other bases of classification (i.e., other
than race, ethnicity, alienage, and gender) under a single, weaker
version of the two-step equal protection test known as “rational
basis review.”  Under rational basis review, the government need
only have a “legitimate” purpose, and the challenged classification
need only be “rationally related” to achieving that purpose.166  At
first glance, the cases applying this test may seem different from
race and gender cases because the rational basis cases are very
deferential to the government, with none of the talk of suspicion or
allegations of pretext we have seen above.167  This deference,
161. See id. at 536.
162. See id. at 546.
163. See id. at 540-45.
164. Id. at 541 (citations omitted).
165. See id. at 542-43.
166. See TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-2, at 1439-43.
167. See id. at 1442-43.
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though, makes sense.  Most lawmaking should not raise suspicion
of prejudice or bias on its face — race and gender are special cases,
each with a special history.
It would be a mistake, however, to see rational basis review as
different in kind from strict and intermediate scrutiny.  Strict scru-
tiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review are different
points along the same spectrum.  Examination of the rational basis
review cases reveals that the Court still is looking for laws enacted
out of bias or prejudice, and that the fit question still is used to
confirm or dispel the Court’s initial impression of the law.  The key
question will be how the Court forms the initial impression that
will be tested by the two-step equal protection analysis.
1. A Little History of Rational Basis Review.  As initially
conceived and applied, rational basis review was a doctrine just
begging for problems.  The test arose in the wake of the
substantive due process doctrine associated with Lochner v. New
York.168  The Lochner due process cases today are disparaged as
typifying the worst in judicial activism.169  During the so-called
Lochner era, the Court subjected government economic
regulations — such as minimum wage laws, maximum hour laws,
and other labor laws170 — to a heightened form of judicial scrutiny.
168. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
169. Lochner was not the first case to apply substantive due process to eco-
nomic interests; but it is the most infamous, earning that period of judicial deci-
sions the derisive name of the Lochner era.  For another example of a Lochner
era decision, see Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (declaring unconstitu-
tional a state law that prohibited payments on marine insurance policies issued by
out-of-state companies that were not licensed to do business in the state).  The
ghost of Lochner has haunted the Court ever since, with justices invoking the case
to accuse their opponents of unjustified judicial activism.  See Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (declining to follow Lochner, stating “we do not
sit as a super-legislature”); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 4
(1993) (“[U]ntil recently virtually all major discussions of Lochner . . . took for
granted that the case vividly illustrates the potential harm when activist judges
turn away from important institutional norms and become more interested in
making law than in interpreting it.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CON-
STITUTION 45 (1993) (noting that the Lochner “period is often thought to sym-
bolize an unjustified form of judicial ‘activism’”); WIECEK, supra note 86, at 123-
25.
170. See, e.g.,  Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking
down minimum wage law for female workers); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915) (striking down a state law that prohibited employers from conditioning
employment on employee’s agreement not to join a union).
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Under this heightened scrutiny, the judgment of the legislature was
given little, if any, deference by the Court.  The Court decided for
itself such questions as (1) what the government’s purpose was,
and (2) whether the government’s law fit its purpose.171  The Court
then greatly restricted the number of permissible purposes the
government might achieve in regulating the economy.172  Lochner
era substantive due process analysis, then, closely resembled
modern strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Lochner line of cases has been criticized as an era of ille-
gitimate judicial activism in which the Supreme Court Justices im-
posed their own personal economic ideology on the democratic
branches.173  According to the standard criticism, the Justices’ eco-
nomic views had no basis in the Constitution.174  Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Lochner captures the objection:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part
of the country does not entertain.  If it were a question whether I
agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and
long before making up my mind.  But I do not conceive that to
be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or
disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to
embody their opinions in law. . . . Some of these laws embody
convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share.  Some
may not.  But a constitution is not intended to embody a par-
ticular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
171. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 8.2.2, at 480-82; TRIBE, supra note 15,
§ 8-3, at 568-70.
172. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 8.2.2, at 480-82; TRIBE, supra note 15,
§ 8-4, at 570-74.  In Lochner, the Supreme Court held that a New York law limit-
ing bakers’ working hours violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
protection of “liberty.”  Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (“The right to purchase or to sell
labor is part of the liberty protected by . . . [the Fourteenth A]mendment.”).  Ac-
cording to the Court, the then-existing common law rules of contract — which left
the employer and the bakers free to set working hours — were a natural condi-
tion of liberty, free from government action.  See GILLMAN, supra note 169, at 27;
SUNSTEIN, supra note 169, at 45.  Of course, this view seriously is flawed.  The so-
called “free market” was made possible by a complex web of common law rules
— of tort, contract, etc. — that protected the expectations of the participants in
the market.  See GILLMAN, supra note 169, at 26 (“Of course, this ‘natural society’
itself was produced by a complex and politically charged system of legal rules and
principles concerning property rights, contractual obligations, and tortious liabili-
ties whose social effects were far from neutral.”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 169, at 50.
173. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 8.2.2, at 486.  This is not the only as-
sessment of the Lochner era.  For kinder views, see GILLMAN, supra note 169;
SUNSTEIN, supra note 169; Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1228-36 (1998).
174. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 8.22, at 486.
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relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.  It is made
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of
our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and
even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States.175
Under this stinging indictment, the Supreme Court was charged
with lawless conduct — imposing its personal political beliefs on
the nation without legal warrant.
When the Lochner line of cases finally was overruled,176 the
Court retreated to a much more deferential form of review — the
predecessor to rational basis review.  Stung by criticism of the
Lochner era, the Court’s application of the rational basis standard
looked more like judicial abdication than judicial review.177  For
example, in Railway Express Agency v. New York,178 the Court up-
held a New York law that permitted motor vehicles to carry adver-
tisements only for the business of the vehicle’s owner.  The state’s
purpose was traffic safety — to prevent distractions that would
lead to traffic accidents.179  The state did not explain, however, why
its distinction between owner-advertising and other advertising fit
this purpose.  The Court also did not say why the distinction fit the
purpose, and moreover it did not seem to care.  In upholding the
statute, the Court said: “The local authorities may well have con-
cluded that those who advertise their own wares on their trucks do
not present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or ex-
tent of the advertising which they use.”180  The City “may” so have
concluded, or the City “may not” so have concluded.  It just did
not seem to matter to the Court; either way, the traffic regulation
was constitutional.  The Court seemed very willing to concede the
fit question in its early rational basis cases.181
The ghost of Lochner haunted the Court in Railway Express
Agency.  Before reaching the equal protection claim, the Court
made clear that it was done with Lochner due process:
175. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
176. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a law
establishing a minimum wage for women, and overruling Adkins v. Children’s
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), the Lochner era case that held to the contrary).
177. See TRIBE, supra note 15, § 8-7, at 581-86.
178. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
179. See id. at 109.
180. Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
181. See Linde, supra note 23, at 210 (“That is not judicial review but dismissal
of a claim of review.”); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S.
483, 488-89 (1955) (upholding a statute that prohibited opticians from adjusting
eyeglasses, but allowed ophthalmologists and optometrists to do so).
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We do not sit to weigh evidence . . . in order to determine
whether the regulation is sound or appropriate; nor is it our func-
tion to pass judgment on its wisdom.  We would be trespassing
on one of the most intensely local and specialized of all munici-
pal problems if we held that this regulation had no relation to
the traffic problem.182
This deference carried over to the Court’s equal protection analy-
sis.
In its post-Lochner cases, the Court also was very forgiving in
applying the first step of equal protection analysis, and willing to
hypothesize a “conceivable” purpose for the government.183  If the
government either failed to articulate a purpose or asserted an im-
permissible purpose, the Court stood ready to bail out the gov-
ernment.184  And, since the Court found almost any purpose per-
missible, the Court’s imagination almost certainly would conjure a
permissible, hypothetical state purpose.185  The result was that no
law failed this early version of rational basis review.
In sum, early rational basis review held the government to lit-
tle if any standard of review.  This was understandable considering
that the doctrine arose during a period in which the Court was re-
covering from attacks on prior judicial activism.  Since truly any
law could pass this version of rational basis review, something had
to change if the Court was ever to strike down a law under rational
basis review.
2. The Threat of a Rational Basis Tautology.  The modern
Court inherited a rational basis test without teeth.  The Court’s
unflinching acceptance of any imaginable government purpose
threatened to make the rational basis test a tautology.  In that
tautology, the government achieves perfect means-end fit by
defining its purpose based on the result that the law ultimately
achieves.186  For example, recall Beazer, the case where the New
182. Railway Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 109 (citation omitted).
183. See TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-3, at 1443.  For an example, see Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552, 563 (1947) (upholding
nepotism policy for hiring river pilots based on conceivable government purpose
to gain “[t]he benefits to morale and esprit de corps which family and neighborly
tradition might contribute”).
184. See, e.g., Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488-89; Kotch, 330 U.S. at 563-64.
185. See TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-3, at 1443.
186. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 186-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting); TRIBE, supra note
15, § 16-2, at 1440 (“Without . . . a requirement of legitimate public purpose, it
would seem useless to demand even the most perfect congruence between means
and ends, for each law would supply its own indisputable — and indeed tautologi-
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York Transit Authority refused to hire methadone users.187  The
Equal Protection argument would become a tautology if the
Transit Authority could say that its hiring policy was implemented
to harm methadone users.  The policy fits this purpose perfectly.
To avoid this tautology, the Court must enforce some limits on the
purposes the government can achieve.
The Court almost fell into the tautology approach in United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, which involved an
anomaly in federal law that allowed railroad workers who also held
other employment to collect both a federal railroad pension and
social security benefits.188  To close this loophole, Congress
amended the federal railroad law to eliminate prospectively the
windfall of social security benefits.189  For railroad workers who al-
ready had qualified for the windfall of dual benefits, the new fed-
eral law allowed some to retain the benefits but retroactively ter-
minated the benefits of others.190  The law did so based on factors
such as length of service, a period of past separation from the rail-
road industry, and lack of current connection with the railroad in-
dustry.191  Thus, the new federal railroad law discriminated between
classes of railroad employees who had become eligible for windfall
benefits.192  The question was whether the dividing line served a
permissible government purpose.193
Congress’s purpose in cutting back on benefits was to salvage
the financial viability of the federal railroad pension fund.194  Con-
gress, and the Court, never articulated why the distinction drawn
by the statute, as opposed to any other distinction between benefit
recipients (e.g., age, service record, etc.), was in any way related to
Congress’s purpose.  Rather, reminiscent of Railway Express
Agency, the Court said it did not know and did not care: “Congress
could properly conclude that persons who had actually acquired
                                                                                                                                
cal — fit: if the means chosen burdens one group and benefits another, then the
means perfectly fits the end of burdening just those whom the law disadvantages
and benefiting just those whom it assists.”); Linde, supra note 23, at 208
(“[A]lthough it purports to leave policy choices to the political process, the
[rational basis] test depends on holding the law to some objective other than the
immediate effect of the law itself.”); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and
Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128 (1972).
187. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
188. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 168.
189. See id. at 169-73.
190. See id. at 168-73.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 172-73.
193. See id. at 177.
194. See id. at 169-70.
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statutory entitlement to windfall benefits while still employed in
the railroad industry had a greater equitable claim to those bene-
fits than  . . .  [those] who were no longer in railroad employment
when they became eligible for dual benefits.”195  This passage raises
two relevant points.  First, the Court does not care — it is irrele-
vant — whether this “equity” rationale was the government’s ac-
tual purpose.  Indeed, as the Court later stated, “[i]t is, of course,
‘constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay
the legislative decision . . . .’”196
Second, the “equity” purpose accepted by the Court makes
equal protection rational basis review a tautology.  According to
the Court, Congress based the benefits determination on equitable
grounds — who was more deserving — but any law could be so jus-
tified.197  For example, in Beazer, one could argue that the Transit
Authority could not hire everyone and, on balance, non-
methadone users had a “greater equitable claim to” a Transit
Authority job.  It is a self-evident proposition!  It is inherent in any
classification that those not burdened by the classification are con-
sidered, by the government at least, to have greater equitable enti-
tlement to a benefit or interest in avoiding a detriment.  As Justice
John Paul Stevens noted in Fritz:
[I]f the analysis of legislative purpose requires only a reading of
the statutory language in a disputed provision, and if any
“conceivable basis” for a discriminatory classification will repel a
constitutional attack on the statute, judicial review will constitute
a mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did
what it intended to do.198
To avoid this tautology, we need to ask — as the Fritz Court did
not — why one group has a greater equitable claim over another.
In Beazer, non-methadone users had a greater equitable claim to
Transit Authority jobs because they posed less of a safety threat to
the passengers than did methadone users.199  In Fritz, the Court and
Congress were silent on this important question.
Fritz fits within the original, ultra-deferential approach to ra-
tional basis review.  The Court will accept virtually any govern-
ment purpose — asserted or hypothetical.  The Court’s ability to
manufacture any conceivable government purpose ensures that the
law will pass the fit analysis because, as the tautology criticism
shows, any law can be defined as intended to accomplish what it
195. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 179 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)).
197. See id. at 178.
198. Id. at 180 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
199.  See Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 588-89 (1979).
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actually accomplishes.  If a law is to be struck down under rational
basis review, something must give; some part of the analysis must
not concede everything to the government.  But which part?
3. Signs of Life in Rational Basis Review.  Our answer lies in
the general mission of the Court’s equal protection doctrine.
Recall that the Court uses equal protection analysis to make a
single, crucial determination: Was the challenged law enacted out
of bare dislike of the targeted group?200  With gender and race, the
Court suspects that those classifications are the product of
prejudice and uses the two-step equal protection analysis to dispel
or confirm their suspicion.201  In rational basis cases, however, the
Court has no general reason to suspect that prejudice or bias is
behind the challenged law.202  Thus, there is no suspicion for the
two-step test to confirm or dispel, and we should not be surprised
that the Court thus far had upheld practically every law it reviewed
under the rational basis test.  Further, it is not surprising that the
only three cases where the Court has used equal protection
rational basis review to strike down a law are also the three cases
in which the Court strongly suspected that the law was based on
bias or prejudice.  This section examines those cases.
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno203 involved
a challenge to a federal statute that excluded from the Food Stamp
program any household that contained a person who was not re-
lated to any other member of the household.  The classification
was intended to prevent fraud in the Food Stamp program be-
cause, the government argued, households with unrelated indi-
viduals were more likely to be constituted solely for the purpose of
gaining Food Stamps.204  After Railway Express Agency, one would
expect the Court to uphold the federal law, reasoning that Con-
gress “may have concluded” that unrelated households pose a
greater risk of fraud than related households.205  After all, Con-
gress’s actual purpose was irrelevant.206
200. See United States v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[A] bare congres-
sional desire to harm politically unpopular groups cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”).
201. See supra notes 48-165 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
203.  413 U.S. 528 (1973).
204. See id. at 535.
205. Indeed, the Government made just this argument:
In essence, the [g]overnment contends that, in adopting the 1971
amendment, Congress might rationally have thought (1) that households
with one or more unrelated members are more likely than “fully re-
lated” households to contain individuals who abuse the program by
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But Moreno signaled something new in rational basis review,
engaging in a more searching review of the federal law.  Doctri-
nally, the Court concluded that the law’s classification (unrelated
households) did not fit the law’s purpose (preventing Food Stamp
fraud).207  Yet, this conclusion does not — indeed, cannot — fully
explain the Court’s decision.  In the abstract, it does not seem il-
logical to suspect that some (because rational basis review does not
require perfect fit) unrelated households will be constituted
fraudulently.  But the Court was not deciding the question in the
abstract.  Rather, the Court reached its decision in the context of
legislative history that suggested that the unrelated-household ex-
clusion was intended to target “hippies” and “hippie communes.”208
In other words, the Court had reason to suspect that Congress’s
stated purpose was a pretext for its actual purpose — to punish the
hippies.  And, the Court concluded, “a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”209
For the first time in a rational basis review case, the Court had
reason to suspect that the challenged law was enacted out of bare
dislike of a group of people.  The Court had found a smoking gun
— legislative history indicating that the law was targeting “hippies”
and “hippie communes” because some legislators did not like
“those people.”210  Given this suspicion, the Court could now use
the two-step equal protection analysis to dispel or confirm their
suspicions.211  The Court concluded that while preventing fraud was
a legitimate end, the classification of unrelated households did not
fit that end particularly well.212  In other words, the fit was poor
enough to confirm that targeting hippies was the government’s
purpose, not preventing fraud.213
                                                                                                                                
fraudulently failing to report sources of income or by voluntarily re-
maining poor, and (2) that such households are “relatively unstable,”
thereby increasing the difficulty of detecting such abuses.
Id. (emphasis added).
206. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
207. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538.
208. See id. at 534 (“The legislative history . . . indicates that that amendment
was intended to prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from partici-
pating in the food stamp program.”).
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 534-38.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 535-36.
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Moreno is part of what some commentators call heightened
rational basis review.214  Compared to cases like Railway Express
Agency and Fritz, Moreno undoubtedly applied closer scrutiny.
The heightened scrutiny, though, makes sense in the context of the
Court’s larger equal protection jurisprudence.  Recall that the fit
analysis is one way of determining whether the government’s as-
serted purpose is its actual purpose.215  If the fit is poor, one ques-
tions whether the government actually intended that purpose.216
Thus, to the extent legislative history already makes the Court sus-
picious that the asserted purpose is a pretext, the Court can use a
heightened fit analysis to determine whether its suspicion is war-
ranted.
After Moreno, the question was what would make the Court
suspect that prejudice lies behind government discrimination.  In
Moreno, statements in legislative history aroused the Court’s sus-
picion.  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc.,217 the next
case to strike down a law under rational basis review, shows that a
social history of mistreatment also can trigger a closer rational ba-
sis scrutiny.  In Cleburne, a city zoning ordinance required a special
permit for operation of a group home for the mentally retarded,
but not for operation of other facilities such as hospitals, homes for
the aged, and fraternities.218  The case arose out of the city’s denial
of a special permit for a group home for the mentally retarded.219
In support of its decision, the city argued that it “was concerned
with the negative attitude of the majority of property owners lo-
cated within 200 feet” of the proposed facility.220  The Court ex-
plained that the city’s protection of private prejudice amounted to
bare dislike of the mentally retarded: “Private biases may be out-
side the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect.”221
The Court’s suspicion colored its analysis of the government’s
remaining purposes.222  The city argued that the special permit was
214. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 9.2.3, at 544; TRIBE, supra note
15, § 16-3, at 1444-46; GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 18-19; R. Randall Kelso, Three
Years Hence: An Update on Filling Gaps in the Supreme Court’s Approach to
Constitutional Review of Legislation, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1995).
215. See supra notes 34-35, 78-80, 126-127 and accompanying text.
216. See id.
217. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
218. See id. at 436 n.3.
219. See id. at 437.
220. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
221. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
222. See id. at 449-50.
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denied because the proposed facility would be located in a flood
plain and raised concerns about liability for the actions of people
who would live at the homes.223  Under traditional rational basis
review, as adopted in cases like Railway Express Agency (involving
advertising on automobiles) and Fritz (involving railway worker
pension benefits), the Court would have deferred to the city’s
judgment, holding that the city “may have concluded” that the
mentally retarded posed greater liability risks or the risk of flood-
ing was too great.  The Cleburne Court was more skeptical.  The
Court explained that, for purposes of flood concerns and liability
risks, it could see no relevant difference between, on the one hand,
group homes for the mentally retarded and, on the other hand,
hospitals, homes for the aged, and fraternities.224  Thus, the city’s
choice to place a greater burden on homes for the mentally re-
tarded was under-inclusive because it did not cover facilities that
also threatened the government’s purpose.225
The poor fit between the city ordinance’s classification
(homes for the mentally retarded) and its purpose (flood concerns
and liability risk) confirmed the Court’s suspicion that the city was
acting out of bias against the mentally retarded.226  The suspicion
arose from two sources: Society’s past discrimination against the
mentally retarded227 and the government’s own argument that the
ordinance reflected the prejudice of private landowners.228  Once
again, the Court used suspicion of prejudice and the two-step equal
protection test to strike down a challenged law based on illegiti-
mate considerations.229
223. See id. at 449.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 450 (“The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case ap-
pears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”).
227. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (“Doubtless, there have been and there will
continue to be instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in fact in-
vidious, and that are properly subject to judicial correction under constitutional
norms.”).
228. See id. at 448.
229. Cleburne stands in contrast to Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993), which
upheld a law that discriminated against the mentally retarded.  Heller involved a
statute that allowed involuntary commitment of the mentally retarded on a
showing of “clear and convincing evidence,” but required a higher standard,
showing “beyond a reasonable doubt,” to involuntarily commit someone for men-
tal illness.  Id. at 315-18.  Unlike Cleburne, the record in Heller did not reveal any
bias in the statute’s history.  Thus, the Court did not approach the law with suspi-
cion.
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One might ask why the historical mistreatment identified in
Cleburne was not enough to justify strict scrutiny.  The reason is
that the trait of mental retardation is different from suspect classi-
fications like race in one important respect: It can be relevant to
government action.230  Legislation singling out the mentally re-
tarded in the areas of employment and confinement, for instance,
have been perceived to benefit the mentally retarded.231  Thus, a
history of mistreatment will not be enough to tighten strict scru-
tiny, but will be enough to heighten the fit analysis.
The Court’s most recent use of rational basis review to strike
down a statute occurred in Romer v. Evans.232  Romer involved a
state constitutional amendment that prohibited any state or local
government body from enacting a law that prohibited discrimina-
tion based on homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual sexual orienta-
tion.233  As Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent pointed out, review of
any law that discriminates based on sexual orientation takes place
against a historical background that includes laws that have disap-
proved of homosexuality and criminalized homosexual conduct.234
This history was enough to arouse suspicion that the state’s consti-
tutional amendment was enacted out of “animosity” toward homo-
sexuals.235
230. See id. at 442-43 (“[T]he States’ interest in dealing with and providing for
[the mentally retarded] is plainly a legitimate one.”).
231. See id at 443-44.
232. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
233. See id.  The Colorado constitutional amendment read as follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orien-
tation.  Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipali-
ties or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regula-
tion, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orien-
tation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimi-
nation.
COLO. CONST., art. III, § 30b.
234. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636, 644-52.
235. The litigants in Romer did not argue on appeal for heightened scrutiny for
classifications based on sexual orientation.  See id. at 641 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).  That argument has been made in several federal courts of appeals, with only
mixed success.  See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (holding that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification); Watkins v.
United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that sexual ori-
entation is a suspect classification), vacated and aff’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d
699 (1989) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., United States Army v. Watkins, 498
U.S. 957 (1990).
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The Court next turned to the two-step equal protection analy-
sis to either confirm or dispel its suspicion.236  The Court made this
point expressly: “By requiring that the classification bear a rational
relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we
ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disad-
vantaging the group burdened by the law.”237  Once again, the fit
was poor.  The state argued that the amendment was enacted out
of “respect for other citizens’ freedom of association, and in par-
ticular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal
or religious objections to homosexuality.”238  Yet, if that was the
state’s limited purpose, a law that applied to all aspects of life —
instead of just employment or apartment rentals — was greatly
overbroad.239  The poor fit confirmed the Court’s suspicion.240
In sum, Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer weave a consistent
thread.  In each case, the Court had some reason to suspect that
the government was acting out of improper motives.  And, in each
case, poor fit between the classification and the government’s pur-
pose did not dispel that suspicion.  As in the race and gender cases,
the Court used the two step equal protection test to root out biased
or prejudiced government action.
E. The Problem of Actual Purpose
A word on so-called actual purpose is appropriate at this
point.  This Article has argued throughout that the two-step equal
protection analysis helps courts smoke out the true intent behind
the government’s stated purpose.  But, as Justice Antonin Scalia
and others accurately have pointed out, there are three main
problems with any quest for the actual purpose of a collective body
236. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 635.
239. See id.
240. See id.  The Court explained the point as follows:
The breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from [the state’s as-
serted] justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.  We can-
not say Amendment 2 is directed at any identifiable legitimate purpose
or discrete objective.  It is a status-based enactment divorced from any
factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate
state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own
sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.  “[C]lass
legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”
Id. (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24).
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such as a legislature.241  First, it is pure fantasy to say that a multi-
member body had a single intent or purpose in taking any given ac-
tion.242  Intent will vary from person to person, with no single, co-
herent view.  Second, even if a single intent were possible to iden-
tify, where does one look?243  The statements of the supporters of
the government action?  What if the supporters do not agree on
the point?  Should one turn to committee reports?244  What about
those who were silent yet supported the government’s action?  We
have no way to decide among these sources.  Third, how many of
the supporters must hold the view for it to be considered the gov-
ernment’s actual purpose?245  All?  More than half?  Again, there is
no principled answer.
We can concede Justice Scalia’s point and still accept the
Court’s use of actual purpose in equal protection analysis.  “Actual
purpose” is used as a legal fiction when we suspect that govern-
ment action is meant to harm a disfavored group.  As noted above,
social or legislative history of disfavor will arouse suspicion that
the government’s actual purpose was to harm the burdened class.
If the fit analysis shows a poor fit between means and end, the
Court confirms its suspicion that the government’s asserted pur-
pose was a pretext, and that the government’s actual purpose was
to harm the burdened class.  Yet, this conclusion does not neces-
sarily mean that the Court believes it has accurately determined
the legislature’s subjective motivation — a task that Justice Scalia
finds futile.  Rather, given all of the reasons (legislative history,
241. See Green v. Block Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (questioning reliance on the opinions of a “larger
handful of Members of Congress” in determining the legislature’s actual pur-
pose); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Plain Meaning: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of
Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 415-17  (explaining
the reasoning behind Justice Scalia’s and others’ skepticism of placing reliance on
any actual purpose or intention of Congress).
242. See Karkkainen, supra note 241, at 415-16 (“A collective body made up of
many members with diverse views cannot have a single intention.”); Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (“The chances that
several hundred men will each have exactly the same determinate situations in
mind as possible reductions of a given [statutory text], are infinitesimally small.”);
Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History at Various Law Schools 15
(1985-86) (copy on file with author).
243. See Karkkainen, supra note 241, at 416; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 641 (1990); Scalia, supra note 242.
244. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing why Committee Reports are
unreliable indicators of congressional intent).
245. See Karkkainen, supra note 241, at 416; Scalia, supra note 242.
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historical evidence, poor fit, etc.) the suspicion of impure motives
is so strong that the Court considers it constitutionally prudent to
deem the legislature’s actual purpose as one to harm a disfavored
group.
The phrase “constitutionally prudent” is a recognition of the
reality that, short of concession in litigation, or affidavits or sworn
testimony from all legislators who supported the government ac-
tion at issue, we cannot discern the government’s subjective moti-
vation.246  The Court always will have less than perfect information
about the government’s purpose.  For this reason, the Court must
identify circumstances under which it is more likely that the gov-
ernment action was improperly motivated.  On this view, the
Court’s use of social history, legislative history, and poor fit are
logical.  First, a history of disfavor indicates that any given law
burdening the disfavored class is more likely the product of bias
than laws burdening other classes.  Second, evidence of prejudice
in legislative history indicates that this law is more likely the prod-
uct of bias than other laws.  If suspicion is aroused on either basis,
the fit question will confirm whether this law is more likely to be
improperly motivated than other laws.  While any of these factors
standing alone might not be enough to infer government bias, their
presence in some combination should be enough to make that pre-
sumption.  Under these circumstances, the Court feels confident
that whatever the actual, subjective motivation of the legislature,
there is an undue danger that the motivation was improper.
III. ALASKA EQUAL PROTECTION
The next section briefly traces the development of Alaska’s
equal protection test and reveals that the Alaska Supreme Court
has adopted a pure means-end balancing approach similar to that
described in Part II.A. above.  As previously discussed, pure
means-end balancing requires a court to weigh the importance of
the government’s end and then evaluate how well the govern-
ment’s means (the challenged government action) achieves its end.
The Alaska Supreme Court varies the stringency of its means-end
analysis depending on various factors, resulting in a “sliding scale”
test.  This pure means-end analysis differs from the federal equal
protection test, which uses means-end analysis to smoke out ille-
gitimate government purposes.
The next two sections of this Part analyze a handful of cases
that apply the Alaska equal protection test.  This section only
246. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1212-14 (1970).
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briefly mentions the Alaska race, ethnicity, alienage, and gender
cases, devoting most of its discussion to cases involving other types
of classifications.  The reason for this emphasis is simple.  As the
Alaska Supreme Court has suggested, analysis under Alaska equal
protection will likely be the same as under federal equal protection
when a law burdens a suspect class (race, ethnicity, or alienage) or
a quasi-suspect class (gender).247  Thus, if Alaska equal protection
offers something different, it must be in cases that involve other
classifications.
Review of the Alaska equal protection cases will show how
the Alaska Supreme Court’s application of a pure means-end
analysis has led to inconsistent results.  The fourth section of this
Part criticizes the ad hoc nature of the pure means-end analysis.  In
some cases, where the Alaska Supreme Court disagrees with the
policy choices behind a specific statute, the court aggressively ap-
plies the means-end test.  In other cases, however, where the court
presumably agrees with the legislature’s policy choices, the court
has applied the means-end analysis in a cursory fashion, deferring
to the legislature’s policy judgment.  As the discussion shows, the
court offers no reason why its means-end analysis is rigorous in
some cases and non-existent in others.  Absent any explanation, we
are left to conclude that the court simply agreed with the policy
judgments behind the laws that it upheld, and disagreed with the
policy judgments behind those it struck down.
As the final section of  Part III explains, it is not surprising
that the pure means-end analysis of Alaska equal protection has
not produced consistent, principled decision-making.  Courts are
not well situated to engage in pure means-end analysis.  While
courts often do so in making common law decisions, such decisions
play to the judiciary’s strengths.  Common law is made on an in-
cremental, case-by-case basis, as concrete disputes arise.  Pure
means-end analysis, on the other hand, asks a court to assess the
wisdom of a rule as a whole and in the abstract.  As discussed in
the final section, this difference between common law and pure
means-end analysis explains why courts are suited to the former
but not the latter.
A. Development of Alaska’s Sliding Scale
For almost the first twenty years after statehood, the Alaska
Supreme Court merely followed the federal model of equal protec-
247. See State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192-93 (Alaska 1983) (confirming
that strict scrutiny applies to classifications based on race or ethnicity).
MCGREAL.QUALITY2.DOC 11/13/98  10:37 AM
254 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [15:2
tion.248  In the mid-1970’s, however, the court began voicing discon-
tent with what it saw as the rigid character of federal equal protec-
tion.249  Spurred by an influential article in the Harvard Law Re-
view,250 the court criticized the seeming all-or-nothing nature of
federal equal protection analysis.  On the one hand, if a law was
subject to strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court always would strike
down the law.251  On the other hand, if a law was subject to rational
basis review, the Supreme Court invariably would uphold the
law.252  Members of the Alaska Supreme Court believed that this
two-tiered approach gave little, if any, protection to non-suspect
classes and that the commands of state equal protection required
something more.
In a series of three cases, the Alaska Supreme Court finally
began re-shaping state equal protection analysis to address the
problems it saw in federal equal protection.253  First, in Isakson v.
Rickey,254 the supreme court explained that it would tighten the fit
requirement for all non-suspect classifications: “Judicial tolerance
of over-inclusive and under-inclusive classifications is notably re-
duced.  Legislative leeway for unexplained pragmatic experimenta-
tion is substantially narrowed.”255  This first change did not reduce
248. See Nelson, supra note 13, at 13 (“In the early years following statehood,
Alaska courts followed federal equal protection analysis when adjudicating the
state’s own constitutional guarantee of equal protection.”); Wise, supra note 13,
at 21-23; see, e.g., Lynden Transp., Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975)
(upholding decision that the residency-nonresidency distinction in amendments to
the Alaska Motor Freight Carrier Act violated the state’s Equal Protection
Clause); Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1963) (holding statute prohibiting
grant of stay pending appeal in fishing license revocation cases unconstitutional
due to violation of equal protection).  Alaska’s equal protection provision reads
as follows: “[A]ll persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities,
and protection under the law.”  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
249. See Nelson, supra note 13, at 14-15; Wise, supra note 13, at 22-29; see also,
Lynden Transport, 532 P.2d at 706 n.10; State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125, 1127 n.12
(Alaska 1974); State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 n.4 (Alaska 1973).
250. Gunther, supra note 16.
251. See Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 361-62 (Alaska 1976).
252. See Isakson, 550 P.2d at 361-62; Adams, 522 P.2d at 1127 n.12 (citing
Wylie, 516 P.2d at 145 n.4).  The Alaska Supreme Court was reacting to a two-
tiered federal equal protection test because, at that time, the Supreme Court had
yet to create the intermediate level of scrutiny for gender cases.  See supra notes
95-122 and accompanying text.
253. For a detailed review of the early development of Alaska equal protection
doctrine, see Wise, supra note 13, at 24-34.
254. 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976).
255. Id. at 362 (quoting Gunther, supra note 16, at 20).
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the rigidity of the equal protection analysis; it only heightened the
level of scrutiny applied in the bottom tier of the still rigid frame-
work.256  Second, in State v. Erickson,257 the supreme court indicated
that it would loosen the rigid tiers of equal protection analysis, ap-
plying instead multiple levels of review tailored to the law at is-
sue.258  The precise level of scrutiny would be based on the classifi-
cation created and the individual interest burdened by the
challenged law.259  This test is what has become known as the
Alaska sliding scale approach to equal protection.
In the third case, State v. Ostrosky,260 Alaska equal protection
took its current form.  The court described its new doctrine as fol-
lows:
In contrast to the rigid tiers of federal equal protection analysis,
we have postulated a single sliding scale of review ranging from
relaxed scrutiny to strict scrutiny.  The applicable standard of re-
view for a given case is to be determined by the importance of
the individual rights asserted and by the degree of suspicion with
which we view the resulting classification scheme.261
Note that the court’s description of the sliding scale incorporates
the notion of suspicion of certain classifications,262 as I have argued
the federal test does.  In the next section, which reviews Alaska
Supreme Court cases applying the sliding scale approach, we will
see that the court never follows through with the suspicion-
centered approach, instead embarking on an unbounded policy re-
view of a statute’s means-end fit.
256. The Alaska Supreme Court seemed to recognize this point: “This new
standard will, in short, close the wide gap between the two tiers of equal protec-
tion by raising the level of the lower tier from virtual abdication to genuine judi-
cial inquiry.”  Id. at 363.
257. 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
258. See id. at 11-12.
259. See id.  The court states that:
In applying the Alaska Constitution, . . . there is no reason why we can-
not use a single test.  Such a test will be flexible and dependent upon the
importance of the rights involved.  Based on the nature of the right, a
greater or lesser burden will be placed on the state to show that the clas-
sification has a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate governmental
objective.  Where fundamental rights or suspect categories are involved,
the results of the test will essentially be the same as requiring a
“compelling state interest”; but, by avoiding outright categorization of
fundamental and non-fundamental rights, a more flexible, less result-
oriented analysis may be made.
Id.
260. 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983).
261. Id. at 1192-93 (emphasis added).
262. See id.
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B. The Sliding Scale as Pure Means-End Analysis
The current formulation of the sliding scale test, and the one
cited to and applied by the Alaska Supreme Court, appears in
Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown.263  The case involved a
challenge to a portion of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation stat-
ute.264  One section of the statute required adjustment of workers’
compensation benefits for any recipient who moved out of state.265
Specifically, the statute adjusted the compensation by multiplying
the workers’ current compensation rate “times the ratio of the av-
erage weekly wage of the state in which he resides and the average
weekly wage of Alaska.”266  The statute assumed that a state’s wage
rate was a good indicator of the state’s relative cost of living.267
Thus, if a recipient moved to a state with a higher wage rate than
Alaska, the recipient would presumably need increased compensa-
tion to keep pace with the cost of living, and vice versa.268  The ra-
tio would accomplish this adjustment.269
The plaintiff in Brown was a worker who began receiving
workers’ compensation benefits in Alaska, and subsequently
moved to California.270  Under the adjustment provision, his bene-
fits were cut by more than fifty percent due to his move to Califor-
nia.271  Brown brought suit claiming that the adjustment provision
violated the state equal protection guarantee.272  He argued that the
statute unfairly discriminated between workers’ compensation re-
cipients who moved out of state and those who remained in
Alaska.273
Drawing on precedent, the court restated the Alaska equal
protection doctrine in its current form.274  Because the Brown for-
mulation is quoted consistently (often in full)275 and applied by the
court, it is worth setting forth verbatim:
263. 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984).
264. See id. at 266 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.175(d) (Michie 1981)).
265. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.175(d) (Michie 1981).
266. Id.
267. See Brown, 687 P.2d at 272.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 268.
271. See id. (cutting the benefits from $551.86 to $211.91).
272. See id. at 271.
273. See id. at 269-71.
274. See id. at 269-70.
275. See, e.g., Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391,
396-97 (Alaska 1997) (quoting the Brown equal protection test in full).
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First, it must be determined at the outset what weight should be
afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged
enactment.  The nature of this interest is the most important
variable in fixing the appropriate level of review.  Thus, the ini-
tial inquiry under article I, section 1 of Alaska’s constitution goes
to the level of scrutiny.  Depending upon the primacy of the in-
terest involved, the state will have a greater or lesser burden in
justifying its legislation.
Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes
served by the challenged statute.  Depending on the level of re-
view determined, the state may be required to show only that its
objectives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum, or,
at the high end of the scale, that the legislation was motivated by
a compelling state interest.
Third, an evaluation of the state’s interest in the particular
means employed to further its goals must be undertaken.  Once
again, the state’s burden will differ in accordance with the de-
termination of the level of scrutiny under the first stage of analy-
sis.  At the low end of the sliding scale, we have held that a sub-
stantial relationship between means and ends is constitutionally
adequate.  At the higher end of the scale, the fit between means
and ends must be much closer.  If the purpose can be accom-
plished by a less restrictive alternative, the classification will be
invalidated.276
Once again, note the differences from federal equal protection
analysis.  First, under the Alaska test, the level of scrutiny will vary
depending upon the individual interest that the law burdens, while
the United States Supreme Court largely has abandoned the prac-
tice of recognizing preferred rights under the Equal Protection
Clause.277  Second, even at the lowest level of equal protection scru-
tiny, Alaska applies a heightened level of means-end scrutiny.278
Whereas the federal courts require only a mere “rational relation-
ship” between means and end, Alaska requires at least a
“substantial relationship between means and ends.”279  Third, the
court dropped any mention of suspicion of certain classifications.280
This omission suggests that Alaska equal protection will not focus
on a search for government bias or prejudice.  The question will be
whether some other standard will emerge to guide the court’s
means-end analysis, or whether the court will apply a pure means-
end test.
276. Brown, 687 P.2d at 269-70.
277. See supra note 49.
278. See Brown, 687 P.2d at 269.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 269-74.
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In Brown, the plaintiff argued that the worker’s compensation
statute should be subject to heightened scrutiny because it bur-
dened two important rights: (1) “a right to receive the full measure
of workers’ compensation benefits which he would receive but for”
the adjustment provision of the Alaska statute, and (2) a
“constitutional right to travel.”281  The court dismissed Brown’s
first argument with relative ease.282  The court explained that the
first asserted right really reduces to a claim that workers who move
out of state have a right to be paid the same as workers who re-
main in state.283  Stated this way, the right is merely a more par-
ticular statement of the general equal protection analysis — that
two groups are similarly situated and thus ought to be treated the
same.284  Thus, the first asserted right does not add anything to the
equal protection analysis, but rather begs the question whether the
different treatment is justified.
The court gave greater weight to Brown’s second asserted in-
terest — the right to travel.285  According to the court, Alaska rec-
ognizes a “right of interstate migration,”286 and the workers’ com-
pensation adjustment provision, by decreasing benefits for some
recipients who leave the state, places a financial burden on that
right.287  Thus, the court applied a heightened level of equal protec-
tion review: “[T]he burden on the state to justify this legislation is
a very high one.”288
281. Id. at 270.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 271.
286. Id. (citing Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 452 (Alaska 1980), rev’d on
other grounds, 457 U.S. 55 (1982)).
287. See id., 687 P.2d at 273 (stating that the adjustment provision “imposes a
substantial penalty upon the exercise by Brown . . . of the right to travel out of
Alaska”).  The state had argued that the adjustment provision did not place any
financial burden on the right to travel.  According to the state, Alaska law merely
adjusted the worker’s benefits to reflect changes in the worker’s cost of living.
The court rightly noted, however, that the state used a state’s “average wage” as
an indicator of the state’s cost of living.  As the state conceded, “there is no nec-
essary correlation between wages and cost of living.”  Id. at 274.  Thus, the possi-
bility existed that a benefit recipient could move to a state with a lower average
wage but a higher (or similar) cost of living.  This worker would receive reduced
benefits even though her cost of living increased or remained unchanged.  Thus,
in some cases, the adjustment provision would place a financial burden on the re-
cipient’s ability to travel out of state.
288. Id. at 273.
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Just how high the court raised the bar on the state is not en-
tirely clear.  Consider the court’s discussion of the state’s purposes.
The state offered two purposes for the adjustment provision: Re-
duce the costs of the workers’ compensation system, and “align
benefit levels to the economic environment of the recipient.”289
The court’s treatment of these two interests suggests that the court
was applying a level of scrutiny similar to the intermediate scrutiny
(for gender cases) of the federal equal protection test.  First, the
court outright rejected saving costs as a permissible government
purpose.290  The court explained that any discrimination among
benefit recipients could have this effect, and thus some other rea-
son must justify the discrimination among recipients.291  The United
States Supreme Court made a similar argument in Reed v. Reed,292
the case in which a state statute preferred men over women as ad-
ministrators of decedent’s estates.293  In Reed, the state had argued
that the law was justified because it saved the cost of a hearing to
appoint an administrator when a man and a woman applied.294  The
Reed Court struck down the statute, holding that mere cost savings
could not justify discrimination based on gender.295  Reed stands in
stark contrast to Fritz, where the Court upheld a federal law that
awarded different benefits to different classes of railroad employ-
ees.296  In Fritz, the government argued that its purpose was to save
costs on employee benefits, and the Court upheld the law under
rational basis review.297  Unlike Reed, the Fritz Court had no rea-
son to suspect that the government was biased or prejudiced
against one class of railroad workers or another.  When the suspi-
cion was present in Reed, cost savings could not support the law;
when suspicion was absent in Fritz, cost savings was a permissible
objective.
Reed and Fritz suggest that Brown was applying a level of
scrutiny akin to the federal intermediate scrutiny.  If so, the state
would need an important interest to uphold its law.298  This sugges-
tion is supported by the court’s analysis of the state’s second pur-
pose — adjusting benefits to meet the recipient’s economic situa-
289. Id. at 272.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
293. See id.
294. See id. at 76.
295. See id. at 76-77.
296. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
297. See id. at 169-80.
298. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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tion.299  The state requires such adjustments to encourage workers
to rehabilitate themselves and get back to work.300  The Alaska
workers’ compensation scheme primarily does this by setting the
worker’s benefit at only eighty percent of her prior average weekly
wage.301  The worker then has an incentive to get back to work to
increase her wages.302  That incentive, however, will be diminished
if the worker can simply take her benefits and move to a state with
a lower cost of living.303  If the worker could do so, she could in-
crease her real wages above her average weekly wage in Alaska.304
To prevent such a windfall, the state requires an adjustment of
benefits when a recipient moves out of state.305
The court agreed “that the State has important interests in
avoiding disincentives to rehabilitation and in creating incentives
for injured workers to go back to work.”306  The court’s word
choice is significant.  The court describes the state’s interest as
“important,” the same standard used by intermediate scrutiny un-
der federal equal protection analysis.307  The court explained that
this important interest was enough to survive the heightened level
of equal protection scrutiny triggered by the right to travel.308
Having identified an acceptable state interest, the court
turned to the means-end analysis.  Once again, the court did not
identify the precise level of scrutiny it applied, except to say that
the state faced a “very heavy” burden.309  The court essentially held
that the adjustment provision is both under- and over-inclusive to
an extent that violates the state equal protection guarantee.
Again, however, the court failed to specify what standard it applied
or what factors it considered.310  To gain insights into the court’s
method of analysis, we again need to examine how the court ar-
gued its points.
In analyzing the means-end fit of the Alaska statute, the court
first examined the use of a state’s average wage as a measure of the
299. See Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 272 (Alaska
1984).
300. See id.
301. See id. at 267 n.1.
302. See id. at 272.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
307. Id.
308. See id. at 273-74.
309. Id. at 273.
310. See id.
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state’s cost of living.311  Not surprisingly, the court found that aver-
age wage is an imperfect measure of cost of living.312  The court ex-
amined wage and cost of living statistics from the legislative history
and discovered that a benefit recipient who moved from Alaska
would receive an average benefit reduction that would be 142 per-
cent of her average decrease in cost of living.313  The state re-
sponded that the court’s statistical argument was flawed for two
reasons, and, for these two reasons, the legislature chose to use av-
erage wage as the statutory variable.314  First, the state determined
that “no reliable” cost of living statistics existed.315  Second, the
federal cost of living statistics that exist would “[n]o longer be
available after 1982.”316  For these reasons, the state chose average
wages as a proxy for cost of living.317  The state knew that average
wage was not a perfect proxy for cost of living, but concluded that
it was the best available option.318
The court rejected the state’s use of average wages.319  The
court rested its decision on two main points.  First, because “there
is no necessary correlation between wages and cost of living,” the
possibility exists that some benefit recipients who leave Alaska will
suffer a benefit decrease larger than the decrease in cost of living.320
This is merely to say that the law does not have a perfect means-
end fit.  Second, a benefit recipient who faces a decrease in bene-
fits larger than their decrease in cost of living will suffer a
“significant penalty.”321  That is, the law is over-inclusive because it
burdens some individuals to a greater extent than necessary to
achieve the government’s purpose.  In short, the court faulted the
adjustment provision because it did not have a perfect means-end
fit.  That the court applied such a heightened fit requirement is
suggested by the following passage: “Accepting for purposes of ar-
gument the inadequacy of all available cost of living statistics, this
fact does not justify the substitution of a different statistical base
and the measure of a different economic variable.”322  If the state
311. See id. at 274.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. See id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
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wants to key benefits to cost of living, it must do so directly, not
through a proxy.
Again, comparison of the court’s analysis to federal case law
will prove instructive.  Recall that in United States v. Virginia, the
United States Supreme Court held that VMI could not exclude any
woman willing and able to undergo the adversative method.323  In
so doing, the Court required a virtually perfect fit.324  Similarly,
Brown seems to hold that a worker’s benefits may not be reduced
unless the state can show an actual decrease in cost of living —
some other statistic cannot serve as a proxy.325  Again, a near per-
fect fit is required.  But recall that in United States v. Virginia the
Court had good reason to require such a tight fit: The law’s fit with
its purpose would confirm or dispel suspicion of gender bias.326  In
Brown, the means-end analysis is not used in this limited way, but
rather allows the Alaska Supreme Court to decide for itself
whether it agrees with the legislature’s policy choice.  In other
words, Alaska’s aggressive equal protection analysis applies re-
gardless of whether the law raises special equality concerns.  And,
the means-end analysis does not perform the limited function of
confirming or dispelling suspicion.  Rather, the Alaska Supreme
Court is left to evaluate the wisdom of the law (via a means-end
fit) as an absolute veto.
Brown’s casual rejection of the adjustment statute masks sev-
eral unanalyzed policy decisions that underlie the holding.  To
analyze adequately the statute, the court should have considered
the state’s regulatory alternatives.  For example, were there statis-
tics other than average wage that could serve as a proxy, for cost of
living?  If so, were those statistics a better proxy and if so, by how
much?  How does one value the increase in the accuracy of the sta-
tistical proxy?  If no other statistical proxy exists, how can the state
adjust for cost of living?  Would the state have to collect its own
data on cost of living?  How much would such a survey cost?
Would the additional cost be justified by the purpose of fairly ad-
justing personnel benefits?
This dizzying list of questions — none of which Brown raised,
much less considered — illustrates how little of a pure means-end
analysis the Alaska Supreme Court engages in or is prepared to
engage in.  As with any means-end analysis, three general types of
questions must be answered.  First, what regulatory alternatives
does the government have?  This question requires some imagina-
323. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539-47 (1996).
324. See id.
325. See Brown, 687 P.2d at 274.
326. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33.
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tion and some factual information.  Imagination will help the deci-
sionmaker consider conceivable alternatives, and factual informa-
tion will help determine whether the alternative is feasible.
Second, what are the costs of the alternatives?  These costs
come in two general types — administrative and regulatory.  Ad-
ministrative costs are the additional costs over and above the nor-
mal operating costs the government incurs in implementing a given
alternative.  For example, if the state was forced to undertake a
survey of the cost of living in each state, the expenses incurred in
conducting the survey (hiring staff, cost of information gathering
and analysis) would be administrative costs.  Regulatory costs are
the costs attendant to the achievement of the government’s pur-
pose.  Regulatory costs are reduced to the extent that an alterna-
tive has a better fit; conversely, such costs are increased if the fit is
worse.  For example, consider Beazer, where the New York Transit
Authority refused to hire methadone users.327  An alternate policy
would be to examine each methadone user to determine who is
safe and who is unsafe.  The cost of performing such examinations
would be an administrative cost.  In performing such examinations,
some unsafe methadone workers undoubtedly would slip through
the cracks, posing a danger to the public.  The increased danger to
the public is a regulatory cost.  But, conversely, some safe metha-
done users will be hired, making the fit somewhat better.  This is a
decrease in regulatory cost.  While one might be able to quantify
administrative costs, regulatory costs are hard to identify and
nearly impossible to quantify.  Yet, they must be part of a means-
end analysis.
As the third step in a means-end analysis, once the above
“data” has been collected and analyzed, the decisionmaker must
weigh and then balance the various costs and benefits.  Less dis-
crimination is clearly a benefit (in that it achieves a constitutional
value), but it will come with administrative and regulatory costs.
How does one weigh the benefits and the costs?  They are incom-
mensurable,328 and no more than contested judgments can be
reached on these points.329  Yet, this is the terrain upon which the
327. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
328. See generally Symposium: Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1169 (1998) (discussing different theories concerning the incomparability of
governmental opinions).
329. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT 1 (1996); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54-58 (1993);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35 (1996); Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term — Foreword: Implementing the
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Alaska Supreme Court has embarked in its equal protection analy-
sis.  Brown, as well as the cases discussed in the next section, show
that the Alaska Supreme Court does not make a credible attempt
at means-end analysis.  As is explained below, the court’s inability
to apply pure means-end analysis should not be a surprise; courts
are not well-suited to the task.
C. Alaska Means-End Analysis in Practice
One might try to limit Brown by explaining that the case dealt
with what the Alaska Supreme Court called the important right to
travel.  Yet, City of Valdez v. 18.99 Acres,330 decided several
months after Brown, confirms that the court may give minimal
deference to the state even under the lowest level of Alaska equal
protection review.  In City of Valdez, the court addressed whether
different pre- and post-judgment interest rates for different types
of condemnation proceedings violated Alaska’s equal protection
guarantee.331  Generally, Alaska law awards pre- and post-
judgment interest to a prevailing party at the rate of 10.5 percent
per year.332  This provision applied to some condemnation pro-
ceedings; any just compensation owed the property owner accrued
interest at a rate of 10.5 percent until the state made payment on
the judgment.333  Such condemnation proceedings generally take
the form of a civil lawsuit, with no payment to the landowner until
after judgment.334
In a special type of condemnation action known as a “quick
take” condemnation proceeding, Alaska law prior to City of Val-
dez prescribed a pre-and post-judgment interest rate of only six
percent.335  Quick take proceedings occur when the state or a local-
ity makes a “declaration of taking” that gives the state immediate
title and right to possession of the property.336  The court described
the difference between quick take proceedings and other condem-
nation actions as follows: “Under a declaration of taking [i.e.,
quick take proceeding], title and right to possession pass to the
state immediately upon filing and depositing an amount for just
                                                                                                                                
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57-58 (1997); Frank I. Michelman, The 1996-
97 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture, 86 CAL. L. REV. 399 (1998).
330. 686 P.2d 682 (Alaska 1984).
331. See id. at 691-92.
332. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.30.070,  09.55.330 (Michie 1996).
333. See City of Valdez, 686 P.2d at 691.
334. See State v. Alaska Continental Developmental Corp., 630 P.2d 977, 995
n.31 (Alaska 1980).
335. See id.
336. Id.
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compensation, while under a complaint for condemnation this
‘taking’ does not occur until judgment is entered by the court.”337
At the time of the declaration, the state must deposit an amount
for just compensation with the court, and the affected property
owner has immediate access to the deposited funds.338  The six per-
cent pre- and post-judgment interest rate applies to any amounts
awarded the property owner (as just compensation) in excess of the
amount deposited with the court.339  The question in City of Valdez
was whether applying different interest rates to quick take and
other condemnation proceedings violated equal protection.340
The court held that the interest rate differential failed even
the most deferential level of equal protection analysis, rational ba-
sis review.341  The court said that “[a] rational explanation for as-
sessing a lower rate of interest against the state . . . in cases where
it gains control and use of the property at an earlier time does not
occur to us.”342 This was the extent of the court’s analysis — the
court’s bald assertion that it could not come up with a reason for
encouraging use of the quick take procedure over other proce-
dures.343  Yet, it does not take much legal imagination to hypothe-
size such a reason.  For example, the quick take procedure results
in an earlier transfer of property rights, thereby reducing uncer-
tainty about those rights.  Under other condemnation procedures,
a substantial period of uncertainty could result.  And, as many
cases and commentators have stated, certainty as to property rights
is an important goal of any legal system because it promotes fur-
ther exchange and development of property and creation of wealth
within society.344  Thus, one reason to encourage use of the quick
take procedure could be to promote certainty in property rights.
337. Id. (citing Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres, 539 P.2d 64, 70 (Alaska 1975)).
338. See id. at 996 n.31
339. See id.
340. See City of Valdez, 686 P.2d at 691-92.
341. See id. at 692 n.20 (“Awarding different interest rates to property owners
on the basis of the type of condemnation action a government brings against them
has no rational basis.”).
342. Id. at 692 (quoting Alaska Continental Developmental Corp., 630 P.2d at
995 n.31).
343. See id.
344. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1, 22 (5th ed.
1998):
[L]egal protection of property rights creates incentives to exploit re-
sources efficiently. . . . The proper incentives are created by parceling
out mutually exclusive rights to the use of particular resources among
the members of society.  If every piece of land is owned by someone – if
there is always someone who can exclude all others from access to any
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Consider another possible rationale for a lower pre- and post-
judgment interest rate for quick take condemnation proceedings.
Recall that in a quick take proceeding the state must deposit an
amount of just compensation with the court, and the landowner
has immediate use of those funds.345  Unlike other condemnation
proceedings, the quick take proceeding advances money to the
landowner quickly, allowing the landowner to use the money as
she pleases, including private investment for yields higher than ei-
ther of the statutory rates.  In other condemnation proceedings,
however, the landowner is forced to make one use of her money
during the pendency of the proceeding — accrue 10.5 percent in-
terest.  Thus, the legislature reasonably could have concluded that
a lower interest rate on quick take proceedings would encourage
the state to use those proceedings, thereby getting the landowner
quicker access to the just compensation.
So, what does City of Valdez tell us about Alaska equal pro-
tection?  Depending on how one chooses to read the case, one
could take a cynical view or a more doctrinal view.  From the cyni-
cal perspective, one could argue that the court simply struck down
the law because it did not think it wise as a matter of policy.  While
the court never says this, it would be consistent with the analysis of
Brown offered above.346  Recall that federal equal protection,
analysis is guided by a central concern — is the government acting
out of bare dislike of the burdened group?  Brown showed that
Alaska equal protection has no such guiding principle.  Rather, the
Alaska Supreme Court engages in a full blown policy analysis of
the state’s purpose and the means used to achieve the purpose —
including the relative cost of alternative regulatory schemes — and
offers its own assessment of the legislature’s choices.  The analysis
does not have so much to do with equality as with good public
policy.  Under this view, City of Valdez is a foreseeable conse-
quence of Brown — an unexplained policy judgment by the su-
preme court that the legislature has not acted wisely.
From a doctrinal perspective, one could argue that the court
did not exercise its legal imagination in support of the challenged
law.  Instead, the court relied on the fact that the state had not of-
fered a reason for its law.  But, this flies in the face of reality.  The
legislature must have had some reason for putting the six percent
                                                                                                                                
given area – then individuals will endeavor by cultivation or other im-
provements to maximize the value of land.  Of course, land is just an ex-
ample.  The principle applies to all valuable resources.
Id.
345. Alaska Continental Developmental Corp., 630 P.2d at 995 n.31.
346. See supra notes 263-329 and accompanying text.
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interest rate on quick take provisions.347  Perhaps it was inadver-
tence that caused the rate change.  Or, perhaps the state wanted to
reduce the amount it paid in interest.  Or, perhaps an interest
group was able to influence the outcome of the legislative proc-
ess.348  Any of these would be reasons, but they might not be le-
gitimate reasons.  For the court to say that the statute exists with-
out reasons behind its provisions is mistaken.
Turner Construction Co., Inc. v. Scales349 suggests that the
cynical perspective is correct because the court, as it did in Brown,
engaged in pure means-end scrutiny of the legislature’s asserted
purposes.  Scales involved an equal protection challenge to the six-
year statute of repose350 for negligence in the design and construc-
tion of structures on real property.351  The six-year period began
running upon substantial completion of the construction project,
regardless of when the injury occurred.352  Thus, the six-year period
347. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL
REASONING 82-85 (2d ed. 1995); Linde, supra note 23 at 212 (“It is a realistic pos-
tulate that laws do not get enacted for no reason at all, not in the American leg-
islative process, but they may be and often are enacted for improper reasons.”).
348. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991); POSNER, supra note 344, § 19.3, at 524-
28.
349. 752 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1988).
350. The court defined the difference between a statute of limitations and a
statute of repose as follows:
A statute of repose differs from a statute of limitation in that the
former may bar a cause of action before it accrues, because the statute
begins to run from a specific date unrelated to the date of injury.  A
cause of action thus precluded is . . . a loss without a remedy.
In contrast, a statute of limitation begins to run when the plaintiff’s
cause of action accrues or is discovered.  It operates to prevent a plaintiff
from sleeping on his or her rights.
Id. at 469 n.2.  The basic purpose of both types of statute is to provide some cer-
tainty to potential defendants regarding potential liability.  In each case, the un-
certainty comes from a different source.  For the statute of repose, the nature of
the undertaking may be such that some claims (though rare) will not accrue until
a much later date.  For the statute of limitations, while the action has accrued, the
injured individual may be the cause of delay and thus uncertainty.  Whatever the
cause, each statute serves as a device to promote certainty and planning.
351. See id. at 469.
352. See id. (discussing the now-repealed version of ALASKA STAT. §
09.10.055(b) (enacted in 1967)).  The statute also allowed an action if the plaintiff
was injured in the sixth year after substantial completion and brought suit within
two years of the injury.  Thus, for some plaintiffs, the outside time period was
eight years after the date of substantial completion of the construction project.
See id.
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could lapse before any injury has been discovered.353  In such cases,
a lawsuit is barred before it even accrues.  The Alaska legislature
adopted this rule to encourage construction in the state by putting
some time limit on liability for design and construction.354
Scales was a lawsuit in which two plaintiffs’ claims were
barred by the six-year statute of repose.355  The two plaintiffs ar-
gued that the statute of repose unconstitutionally discriminated be-
tween, on the one hand, design professionals (i.e., architects, con-
tractors, and engineers) who received the benefit of the statute
and, on the other hand, all others involved in a construction proj-
ect (i.e., owners, materialmen, and tenants) who are not included
in the statute.356  Since the court found that neither a suspect class
nor an important or fundamental right was involved, it concluded
that the lowest level of Alaska equal protection scrutiny applied.
Therefore the court examined whether the six-year statute of re-
pose had a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate government
purpose?357  Once again, the court’s analysis amounted to question
begging.
The court easily identified a legitimate government purpose:
“[T]o encourage construction and avoid stale claims by shielding
certain defendants from potential future liability.”358  Once again,
however, the court held that the state’s means was not sufficiently
tailored to its purpose.359  The defendants offered several justifica-
tions for the state’s choice to distinguish between design profes-
sionals and others involved in a construction project, each of which
had been made in support of similar laws in other states and had
been credited by the courts in those states.360  Nonetheless, the
353. See id. at 470.
354. See id. at 471.
355. See id at 469.
356. See id. at 471.
357. See id. at 470-71.
358. Id. at 471.
359. See id. at 472.
360. For example, the government argued that those in ownership or posses-
sion rationally were treated differently from design professionals because they
“have continuing control over access to and maintenance of the property” and
because of “the different treatment of owners and tenants at common law, such as
the larger class of potential plaintiffs which may sue design professionals, the legal
theories available to those plaintiffs, and the common law defenses available only
to landlords and tenants.” Id. at 471 (citing Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514,
522-25 (Mass. 1982); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715,
718-20 (Pa. 1978)).  The justification for excluding materialmen was that “because
materialmen provide standard goods manufactured by standard processes, they
may be held to higher quality control standards than the design professionals,
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Alaska Supreme Court concluded: “We are not persuaded by any
of these diverse rationales.”361  As in prior equal protection cases,
the court never explained the basis for this conclusory policy
judgment.  But, careful parsing of what the court did say may offer
some clues.
The court never offered any factual or logical argument to
dispute the state’s reasons for the statute of repose.  Instead, the
court’s sole argument against the law was that the statute of repose
might discourage some construction.362  Upon analysis, however, we
see that the court offers no facts in support of this argument, and
the logic of the argument is flawed.  The court focused on the
combined effect of joint and several liability with the six-year stat-
ute of repose.363  The court correctly noted that there may be some
cases where the negligence of a design professional and the negli-
gence of an owner (or some other non-design professional) might
jointly cause an injury.364  In such cases, the Alaska rules on joint
and several liability would make each of the joint tortfeasors liable
for the whole injury, and the rule on contribution among joint tort-
feasors would allow either tortfeasor to obtain a proportional con-
tribution from the other.365  If the statute of repose makes one of
the joint tortfeasors (the design professional) immune from liabil-
ity, however, the remaining joint tortfeasor (the non-design profes-
sional) must bear one hundred percent of the liability.366  Thus, the
six-year statute of repose will increase the potential liability of
non-design professionals by effectively eliminating the right of
contribution from design professionals after the six-year period has
run.367
While the court correctly identified a possible increase in li-
ability of non-design professionals, the court drew the wrong con-
clusion from that fact.  The court argued: “[T]he shift of liability to
[non-design professionals] decreases their incentive to build in cor-
responding measure to the increased incentives of protected par-
                                                                                                                                
whose work is often unique and cannot be completely tested.”  Id. (citing Klein,
437 N.E.2d at 524; Freezer Storage, 382 A.2d at 719).  Furthermore the state ar-
gued that “design professionals have special expertise; they should be encouraged
to experiment and their creativity should not be stifled.” Id. (citing Klein, 437
N.E.2d at 524; O’Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 299 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Mich. 1980)).
361. Scales, 752 P.2d at 471.
362. See id. at 472.
363. See id. at 471-72.
364. See id. at 471.
365. See id.
366. See id.
367. See id. at 471-72.
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ties.”368  But, for this to be true, all (or virtually all) lawsuits against
design professionals also must include non-design professionals as
joint tortfeasors.  Otherwise, there will be cases (perhaps signifi-
cant in number) where the statute of repose can protect design
professionals from liability without a threat of harm to non-design
professionals.  Yet, the court offers no reason to believe that this
latter class of cases is small.  The court cites no facts and offers no
legal argument that liability of a design professional will necessar-
ily entail liability of non-design professionals.  Indeed, it may be
that the statute of repose was enacted to protect design profession-
als from liability to owners and tenants of property.  For example,
the plaintiffs in Scales were a tenant in an apartment complex and
a homeowner.369  The court never takes account of such suits where
non-design professionals such as tenants and owners are the plain-
tiffs (and thus face no threat of liability).
Scales is yet another example of the Alaska Supreme Court
dismissing the government’s proffered rationales in favor of its
own.370  The court offered no evidence to contradict the govern-
ment’s rationale or to support its own reasoning.  Also, the court
did not attack the logic of the government’s rationale regarding the
unique position of design professionals.  Rather, the court merely
offered a fatally flawed argument about the economic incentives
created by the six-year statute of repose and the rules on joint and
several liability.371  Given the lack of factual evidence and the
highly contestable legal arguments, we are left with a single basis
for the result: As a matter of policy, the court did not believe that
design professionals should be treated better than others in the
368. Id. at 472.
369. See id. at 469.
370. The court has done so in several subsequent equal protection cases.  See,
e.g., Gilmore v. Alaska Workers’ Compensation Bd., 882 P.2d 922, 927-29 (Alaska
1994) (holding that wage base on which an injured worker’s disability benefits are
calculated is not sufficiently related to the “legitimate purposes” of the statute to
survive equal protection scrutiny); Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 780 P.2d
1023, 1026-28 (Alaska 1989) (invalidating statute imposing higher tax on out-of-
state insurance companies than in-state insurance companies on the grounds that
the differential rates did not advance the arguably legitimate purposes suggested
by the state); Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379-80 (Alaska
1988) (holding that requirement that nonresident plaintiff post a bond covering
anticipated costs and fees that may be awarded against them is not “sufficiently
well-tailored” to the legitimate goal of providing security).  The court’s equal pro-
tection analysis in each case is similar to the method used in Brown, City of Val-
dez, and Scales.  In each case, the court questioned the means the state used to
achieve its end, concluding that the statute at issue was not a good way to do so.
371. See Scales, 752 P.2d at 471-72.
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construction process.  Perhaps this policy judgment rested on the
court’s perception of the relative political power of design profes-
sionals as opposed to other groups.372  Or, perhaps the court did not
think that the six-year statute of repose was the fairest resolution
of the problem addressed by the statute.  Whatever the reason, the
court acted as an extension of the legislature, registering its vote
based on an off-hand judgment of how well the law balanced the
many complex factors involved.
The unprincipled nature of Scales is further illustrated by the
court’s seemingly contradictory decision in a later case, McConkey
v. Hart.373  McConkey was a medical malpractice action in which
the court addressed the date from which pre-judgment interest ac-
crues.374  Under Alaska law, pre-judgment interest in cases involv-
ing personal injury, death, and damage to property, accrues from
the earlier of the date of service or the date that the defendant re-
ceived written notice of the plaintiff’s claim, whereas in other tort
cases, such as legal and accountant malpractice cases, pre-
judgment interest accrues from the date of injury.375  Thus, some
professionals (i.e., lawyers and accountants) faced an earlier ac-
crual date (date of injury) than other professionals (i.e., doctors
and architects).376  The question was whether the different accrual
dates for different professional malpractice cases violated equal
protection.377
The court began its constitutional analysis by quoting the leg-
islative findings in support of the pre-judgment interest statute:
The legislature . . .  finds . . . cost increases in professional liabil-
ity insurance.  Escalating malpractice insurance premiums dis-
courage physicians and other health care providers from initiat-
ing or continuing their practice or offering needed services to the
public and contribute to the rising costs of consumer health care.
372. This point could be gleaned from the court’s inclusion of the following
statement in its description of the statute: “[Alaska Statutes section] 09.10.055 is
one of many state statutes enacted as a result of a concerted national lobbying
effort by design professionals sparked by an increase in their potential liability for
design and construction defects.”  Id. at 470 n.6 (citing Collins, Limitation of Ac-
tion Statutes for Architects and Builders — An Examination of Constitutionality,
29 FED’N INS. COUNS. Q. 41, 44-45 (1978)).
373. 930 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1996).
374. See id.
375. See id. at 407.  This was not the only reading of the statute; the court
noted that the statute could be read not to make such a distinction.  See id.  The
court, however, accepted the parties’ stipulation as to the meaning of the statute
and decided the constitutional issue on that basis.  See id.
376. See id.
377. See id. at 407-08.
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Other professionals, such as architects and engineers, face simi-
lar difficult choices, financial instability, and unlimited risk in
providing services to the public. . . .
It is the intent of the legislature to reduce costs associated
with the tort system, while ensuring that adequate and appropri-
ate compensation for persons injured through the fault of others
is available.378
The legislature’s purpose was to reduce the cost of litigation
thereby hopefully reducing the burden of professional malpractice
insurance.379  Note how the legislature speaks of “professional li-
ability insurance,” not limiting its purpose to any subset of profes-
sionals.380  Also, doctors, architects, and engineers are set forth as
examples of professionals (“such as”), not as an exhaustive list.381
Given this material, there seems to be no good reason to distin-
guish between, on the one hand, doctors and architects and, on the
other hand, lawyers and accountants.
Once again, the court’s equal protection analysis left much to
be desired.  The court’s entire analysis consisted of the following
passage:
The Senate findings directly address the rising costs of medical
malpractice insurance and the disincentives those costs create for
health care providers.  In this medical malpractice case, then, the
argument that there is no rational basis for the statute is uncon-
vincing.  Reducing health care costs and encouraging the provi-
sion of health care services are legitimate goals which can rea-
sonably be thought to be furthered by lowering the amount of
medical malpractice judgments.  There is thus no merit to Hart’s
constitutional argument, even assuming her interpretation of the
statute is correct.382
This analysis is a good counterpoint to Scales for two reasons.
First, note how the court is now willing to accept the legislature’s
empirical judgment.383  In Scales, the court — without any sup-
porting data — disputed the legislature’s empirical conclusion that
the statute of repose would promote construction.384  In McConkey,
however, the court defers to the legislature’s empirical judgment
that a reduction in pre-judgment interest will “[r]educ[e] health
378. Id. at 408 (quoting Senate Findings and Purpose, C.C.S. S.B. 377, 14th
Leg., 2d Sess. (1986)).
379. See id.
380. Senate Findings and Purpose, C.C.S. S.B. 377, 14th Leg., 2d Sess. (1986)
(emphasis added).
381. Id.
382. McConkey, 930 P.2d at 408.
383. See id.
384. See Turner Constr. Co. v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Alaska 1988).
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care costs and encourag[e] the provision of health care services.”385
Neither case offers a principled reason why deference to the legis-
lature’s empirical judgment was owed in one case but not the
other.  Once again, we see the court acting in the ad hoc manner of
a legislator, agreeing with some policy judgments but not with oth-
ers.
Second, the court does not even pretend to be doing an equal-
ity analysis.  The court concludes that it is rational to think that re-
ducing the cost of medical malpractice claims will reduce the cost
of health care, but that was not the equal protection issue!  The
equal protection issue was whether the distinction between doctors
and other professionals is rationally related to the state’s purpose.
Once again, the difference between Scales and McConkey is stark.
In Scales, the legislature offered reasons why it distinguished be-
tween design professionals and non-design professionals.386  In
McConkey, however, the legislature offered no reason to distin-
guish between doctors and other professionals.  Yet, the Alaska
Supreme Court upheld the unexplained discrimination in McCon-
key and struck down the explained discrimination in Scales.  Again,
the court’s opinions offer no principled reason for the different
analysis in each case.  We have no way of knowing when and why
the Alaska Supreme Court will defer to the state legislature or ag-
gressively question the legislature’s policy judgments.
The court’s equal protection cases have continued on an un-
predictable course to the present, with the court deferring to the
legislature in some cases and rejecting the legislature’s policy
judgments in others.  For example, the court has struck down stat-
utes that imposed different taxes on in-state and out-of-state insur-
ers,387 required a non-resident plaintiff to post a bond covering a
potential award of costs and attorney fees,388 established a hiring
preference for workers in economically distressed zones,389 and set
the wage base for calculation of employee disability benefits.390  In
each of these cases, just as it did in Scales, the court rejected the
government’s argument that a particular public policy justified the
differential treatment.391  Yet, in other cases, the court upheld stat-
385. McConkey, 930 P.2d at 408.
386. See Scales, 752 P.2d at 471.
387. See Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 780 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1989).
388. See Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375 (Alaska 1988).
389. See State v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989).
390. See Gilmore v. Alaska Workers’ Compensation Bd., 882 P.2d 922 (Alaska
1994).
391. See Gilmore, 882 P.2d at 922; Enserch, 787 P.2d at 624; Principal Mutual,
780 P.2d at 1023; Patrick, 765 P.2d at 1375;
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utes that preferred residential over recreational users for purchase
of state land,392 allowed unemployment compensation for a person
pursuing vocational training but not a person attending law
school,393 and provided different workers’ compensation benefits
for employees who lived near their workplace and employees who
worked at a remote site.394  In each of these cases, just as it did in
McConkey, the court merely accepted the government’s argument
that a particular public policy justified the differential treatment.395
And, as with Scales and McConkey, the court never explained why
it engaged in aggressive policy review of some statutes but not oth-
ers.  In short, the pure means-end analysis of Alaska equal protec-
tion cases has not yielded a consistent, principled method for de-
ciding cases.
D. Implications of Alaska’s Means-End Analysis
The preceding sections have reviewed the Alaska Supreme
Court’s application of its sliding scale equal protection test, and the
outcome is not encouraging.  The court appears to use a pure
means-end analysis that is unguided by any constitutional principle
related to equality (or any other constitutional value).  Further, the
means-end analyses are incomplete, conclusory, or contradictory.
In sum, the court has not developed a principled approach to
means-end analysis, and instead registered its agreement or disa-
greement with particular statutes.  This section explains why we
should find these observations troubling.
Institutional concerns suggest that the Alaska Supreme Court
should give up its pure means-end analysis.  While state courts en-
gage in similar analysis in the common law,396 the pure means-end
analysis done in Alaska equal protection is different for two im-
portant reasons.  First, it does not play to a court’s strength.  Ad-
mittedly, common law decisionmaking can entail a form of means-
392. See Reichmann v. State, 917 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1996).
393. See Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1990).
394. See Meek v. Unocal Corp., 914 P.2d 1276 (Alaska 1996).
395. See Reichmann, 917 P.2d at 1197; Meek, 914 P.2d at 1276; Sonneman, 790
P.2d at 702.
396. See generally MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON
LAW (1988).  For example, the Alaska Supreme Court decides issues such as
whether Alaska should adopt strict products liability, see Clary v. Fifth Ave.
Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969), and, within products liability,
whether a consumer should be allowed to recover damages solely to the product
itself, see Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1993).
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end analysis.397  Common law courts are, at least in part, concerned
with whether their decisions serve the purposes that underlie legal
doctrines.398  And, these means-end decisions will necessarily re-
quire both normative and empirical judgments.399  On the norma-
tive side, courts must often value and reconcile competing princi-
ples and values in the law.  For example, they must decide whether
it is more important to achieve deterrence or loss spreading in a
particular context, and to what extent.  On the empirical side,
courts must often decide what effect their decisions will have in the
real world.400  For example, will a particular rule of liability actually
deter future misconduct?401
When it comes to empirical questions, courts are not well
situated.402  Courts generally do not have the resources or the
authority to commission studies on a particular subject (e.g., deter-
rence in tort law) before making a decision.403  And, common law
decisionmaking occurs in a way that minimizes this problem.
Common law courts supposedly make law accretionally, with each
case a small step forward.404  Any reasoning not necessary to the
court’s decision is dicta that does not bind the court.  In this way,
courts have the benefit of the experience brought to bear by each
new case.  Each case that arises can tell the courts something addi-
397. See BURTON, supra note 347, at 97-115 (explaining how legal rules are in-
terpreted and applied to further the law’s purposes); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-99 (6th ed. 1928) (“Few rules in our
time are so well established that they may not be called upon any day to justify
their existence as means adapted to an end.  If they do not function, they are dis-
eased.  If they are diseased, they must not propagate their kind.  Sometimes they
are cut out and extirpated altogether.  Sometimes they are left with the shadow of
continued life, but sterilized, truncated, impotent for harm.”); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 107 (1990) (“[M]eans-end rationality
is closer to the center of the legal enterprise than logic, a term much bandied
about by the profession.”)
398. See BURTON, supra note 347, at 97-115; POSNER, supra note 397, at 105
(“The choice between alternative legal rules often depends on deciding which
makes a closer fit with some underlying goal.”).
399. See EISENBERG, supra note 396, at 14-42; Linde, supra note 23, at 222-23.
400. See EISENBERG, supra note 396, at 37-42; POSNER, supra note 397, at 251-
52.
401. See POSNER, supra note 397, at 253-54 (discussing the empirical assump-
tions that underlie the fellow-servant rule).
402. See Monaghan, supra note 43, at 28-29; Pilchen, supra note 43.
403. See Monaghan, supra note 43, at 28.
404. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5
(1982) (describing “[t]he slow, unsystematic, and organic quality of common law
change”).
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tional about what has gone before, and the courts can then decide
what will come after.405  Individual cases provide “the context of a
concrete, detailed situation that may serve to clarify both the facts
and the equities relevant to decision.”406  By deciding only the case
before it, the court takes on a task for which it has better empirical
information.
The accretional, incremental common law method of making
law case by case based on experience stands in contrast to the leg-
islative method of making law for a broadly defined class of
cases.407  But, Alaska equal protection asks Alaska courts to per-
form the latter function.  In the cases discussed throughout Part
III, the Alaska Supreme Court was not asking whether the statute
was unconstitutional as applied to the party before it.  Rather, the
court spoke broadly, declaring a statute’s constitutionality  across
all cases.  In doing so, the court had before it the experience of one
case — a sufficient basis for incremental common law, but hardly
sufficient for the kind of legislative pronouncement the court has
repeatedly undertaken.
The second reason Alaska equal protection is different from
common law decisions has to do with the role of courts in constitu-
tional cases.  In a common law case, the court generally acts in the
absence of lawmaking by the legislature.408  The court is asked to
405.  See id.
406. Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law without Making Rules, REG.
25, July/Aug. 1981, at 26.
407. I do not mean to suggest that common law decisions have no effect out-
side the decided case.  Precisely the contrary is true, given our commitment to
some form of precedent.  But the scope of the court’s decisionmaking generally
will be much narrower than that of the legislature.  See Frank P. Grad, The As-
cendancy of Legislation: Legal Problem Solving in Our Time, 9 DALHOUSIE L.J.
228, 233-34 (1985) (“The decision of a case may have significant and direct impact
on the law, but it is not likely to have any such direct impact on the social or-
der.”).  While the legislature may address a large chunk of contract law in a single
statute (e.g., Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code on sales of goods), courts
are usually confined to the issue raised by a case and will resolve it on the facts of
that case.  See CALABRESI, supra note 404, at 4 (“The incremental nature of com-
mon law adjudication meant that no single judge could ultimately change the law,
and a series of judges could only do so over time and in response to changed
events or to changed attitudes in the people.”); GRAD, supra, at 233 (“No judicial
decision on a work place injury can have as far-reaching effects as the legislative
establishment of a workers’ compensation system.”)  How that decision applies to
new, different facts will be the question on the table in the next case.
408. There are exceptions to this general characterization.  For example, the
Supreme Court has held that the federal antitrust laws effectively enact the com-
mon law of antitrust, and that the Court is empowered to evolve that doctrine.
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determine the rule for decision given all of the legally relevant
sources and experiences.  In constitutional cases, however, the
court has a statute duly enacted by the legislature.409  For a court to
disturb a legislature’s decision, it should have some articulable ba-
sis in the constitution of the applicable jurisdiction.410  In the fed-
eral equal protection cases discussed in Part II, we saw that the
Court relied on the principle that laws must not be enacted out of
bias or prejudice.  Alaska equal protection has no such guiding
principle.  Instead, Alaska courts register their vote on a statute’s
means-end rationality, without deference to the legislature.
In sum, when making common law, judges are to make law as
judges do.411  Legislators can fail to consider all the arguments in-
volved, use faulty reasoning, fail to muster the relevant facts, or
merely follow the wishes of interest groups if they want to.412  If
they do so, legislators will be called to account in contested elec-
tions.  Courts, however, are not supposed to function in that way.
The court’s sole claim to legitimacy is its ability to persuade
through logic and legal argument.  When these tools fail, judges
                                                                                                                                
See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (Congress
“adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential.  It invokes
the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had
assigned to the term in 1890.”)  Also, some states have statutory provisions that
allow their courts to treat part of the statutory law as common law that can be
evolved.  See CALABRESI, supra note 404, at 83-85.
409. Of course, this statement will not be accurate where the constitutional
challenge is to the procedure of enactment of the law.  See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd,
117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (dismissing for lack of standing for a legal challenge to
President’s potential use of line-item veto).
410. See Gardner, supra note 10, at 814-16; Linde, supra note 23, at 206
(“[G]overnment must be shown to have failed in some respect to comply with the
Constitution before a court can invalidate a law.”).
411. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991)
(noting that while “judges in a real sense ‘make law,’” they do so “as judges make
it, which is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it — discerning what the law is,
rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be”)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
412. See Pilchen, supra note 43, at 363 (“Although legislators normally can
vote for or against legislation merely upon their hunches, ideally they should
study the facts underpinning their work.”).  A group of scholars has argued that
the legislative process is best described as facilitating “unprincipled ‘deals’ among
self-interested private actors.”  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 6 (1990) (describing and
criticizing this view of the legislative process); see POSNER, supra note 344, §§
19.3-19.7, at 496-507; Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Eco-
nomic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1984).  For a criticism of this view, see
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 348.
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are left with little more to justify their holdings than their personal
political beliefs.  While it would be naive to think that such beliefs
play no role in judicial decisionmaking, it would be despairing to
reduce the entire judicial process to that factor.
IV. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE STUDY
The preceding two parts have developed my main thesis: Un-
like federal equal protection analysis, which is geared to answering
a single question (has the government acted out of bias or preju-
dice), Alaska’s state equal protection analysis does not have a doc-
trinal focus, leaving the Alaska Supreme Court free to register its
independent opinion on the legislature’s policy choices through a
pure means-end analysis.  Part III developed this point in review-
ing Alaska Supreme Court low level scrutiny cases.  Given the
work in Parts II and III, this final Part offers suggestions for future
study in state constitutional law.  The suggestions focus on a possi-
ble explanation for the Alaska Supreme Court’s willingness to en-
gage in policy judgments under the guise of equal protection analy-
sis.
Alaska equal protection doctrine does not have a guiding
principle as does federal equal protection.  Recall that the various
parts of the federal equal protection doctrine — suspicion, ends,
and means — all serve a single mission: To determine whether the
government has acted out of prejudice or bias.  When no guiding
principle exists, the court is left with a pure means-end analysis, as
we saw in the cases discussed at the end of Part III.  As discussed
earlier,413 pure means-end analysis entails a complex balancing of
facts and normative values to decide the “best” resolution of a
policy question.  For example, the decisionmaker must determine
what policy alternatives exist, as well as the over- and under-
inclusiveness of each alternative.  Also, the decisionmaker must as-
sess the relative costs of over- and under-inclusiveness.  And, once
the costs are identified, the decisionmaker must value the different
normative goals that underlie the policy.  Not only are these deci-
sions largely unguided, but the outcomes will vary given the ideo-
logical orientation and experience of the decisionmaker.
As mentioned earlier, judges are not good candidates for pure
means-end analysis.  In terms of facts, judges generally are limited
to the dispute before them and do not have the resources or exper-
tise for independent fact gathering and analysis.  In terms of nor-
mative judgments, most judges are unelected and thus the public
413. See supra notes 253-61 and accompanying text.
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has little or no opportunity to register approval or disapproval of
their choices.
So, why would the Alaska Supreme Court embrace pure
means-end analysis as part of Alaska equal protection?  Perhaps
the court has merely defaulted into a familiar method of analysis.
While not as unbounded as pure means-end analysis, state su-
preme courts engage in a similar type of analysis when making
common law decisions and interpreting statutes.414  In common law
decisions, state high courts necessarily consider complex empirical
and normative questions.415  For example, when the Alaska Su-
preme Court recognized the doctrine of strict product liability it
considered the empirical question of deterrence and the normative
question of whether it is proper to hold a party liable without
fault.416  Or, in interpreting the state’s statute of limitations, the
court has considered the purposes that underlie those statutes and
tried to determine which interpretation best served those pur-
poses.417  In each case, the supreme court undertook a form of
means-end analysis.
If state high courts regularly engage in means-end analysis in
common law and statutory cases, why should we care whether the
courts also do so in constitutional cases?  This last question raises
specifically the general question I propose for further study: Is
state constitutional law different from state common or statutory
law and, if so, how?  In the last section of Part III, I offered a pre-
liminary argument that constitutional and common law argument
are different.  In suggesting this focus, this article proposes a direc-
tion for future study of state constitutional law similar to that of
Professor James Gardner.  In a recent article, Professor Gardner
criticized state constitutional law for its inattention to method.418
This Article confirms Professor Gardner’s fears in the area of
Alaska equal protection doctrine.  Instead of developing a method
of constitutional analysis — using constitutional text, history, struc-
ture, and precedent to interpret the state’s unique constitution —
the Alaska Supreme Court defaults to the familiar method of the
common law.  If state constitutional law amounts to nothing more
than common law or statutory method, Professor Gardner is right
— state constitutional law is an impoverished, failed discourse.419
414. See supra notes 397-406 and accompanying text.
415. See id.
416. See Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Ctr., Inc., 455 P.2d 244, 247-48 (Alaska
1969).
417. See Lee Houston & Assocs. v. Racine, 806 P.2d 848, 855 (Alaska 1991).
418. See Gardner, supra note 10.
419. See id. at 836-37.
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In the future, study of state constitutional law should not stop
simply at identifying the superficial test that state courts apply un-
der different constitutional provisions; appearances can be de-
ceiving.  For example, on the surface, the Alaska Supreme Court
seems to be doing something unique in equal protection; closer
analysis proves otherwise.  Future studies instead should scrutinize
the tests in action, as applied, to unearth the courts’ true method.420
Only then can we decide whether state constitutional law offers a
rich new discourse on government.
420. Professor David Schuman’s response to Professor Gardner begins such a
study of Oregon state constitutional law.  See David Schuman, Correspondence,
A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 274 (1992).  Profes-
sor Schuman’s article argues that Oregon’s state equal protection analysis is
grounded in a considered view of the role of equality in the state’s constitutional
system.  See id. at 274-76.  Professor Schuman, however, concedes that “Gardner
is surely correct in his conclusion that state constitutional discourse in most juris-
dictions . . . is impoverished.”  Id. at 276.
Professor Gardner also has joined the project, publishing a case study of con-
stitutional arguments that appeal to the “unique” character of a state or a region.
See Gardner, supra note 12.
